Publications by category
Journal articles
Fonseca MA, Makris M, Giovannoni F (In Press). Auctions with External Incentives: Experimental Evidence. International Journal of Game Theory
Fonseca MA, Chen J, Zhang X (In Press). How Much will Climate Change Reduce Productivity in a High-Technology Supply Chain? Evidence from Silicon Wafer Manufacturing. Environmental and Resource Economics
Fonseca M, Peters K (In Press). Is it Costly to Deceive? People Are Adept at Detecting Gossipers’ Lies but May Not Reward Honesty. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Chakravarty S, Choo L, Fonseca M, Kaplan T (In Press). Should regulators always be transparent? a bank run experiment. European Economic Review
Fonseca MA, Rahimi L (In Press). The effects of income windfalls on labour supply and tax compliance: experimental evidence. Review of Behavioral Economics
Fonseca MA, Gonçalves R, Pinho J, Tabacco GA (2022). How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? an experiment.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
204, 643-662.
DOI.
Chen JC, Fonseca MA, Grimshaw SB (2021). When a nudge is (not) enough: Experiments on social information and incentives.
European Economic Review,
134, 103711-103711.
DOI.
Auerbach JU, Fonseca MA (2020). Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement.
Games and Economic Behavior,
122, 130-149.
DOI.
Peters K, Fonseca MA (2020). Truth, Lies and Gossip.
Psychological Science DOI.
Fonseca MA (2019). Endogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidence.
Studies in Microeconomics,
7(1), 59-74.
Abstract:
Endogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidence
This paper presents experimental evidence on the action commitment game with cost-asymmetric firms in a differentiated-products Bertrand duopoly. Unlike its quantity-setting counterpart, the risk-dominant leader–follower equilibrium Pareto dominates the simultaneous-move equilibrium. This equilibrium also minimizes payoff differences between firms. Hence, one would expect the model to accurately capture behavior. The evidence partially supports the theory: low-cost firms price in the first period more often than high-cost firms, and depending on the treatment, between 40 and 57 per cent of all observations conform to equilibrium play. However, the modal timing outcome involved both firms delaying their pricing decision. This timing outcome is characterized by Nash play and some collusion. The high frequency of delaying decisions could be due to a desire to reduce strategic uncertainty.
Abstract.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Ghosh S, Kumar P, Marjit S (2019). Religious fragmentation, social identity and other-regarding preferences: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India.
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics,
82Abstract:
Religious fragmentation, social identity and other-regarding preferences: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India
We examine the impact of religious identity and village-level religious fragmentation on other-regarding preferences. We report on a series of two-player binary Dictator experiments conducted on a sample of 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural West Bengal, India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of religious fragmentation in the village where subjects reside. Both Muslims’ and Hindus’ aversion to advantageous inequality declines as the probability of facing an out-group member increases. We find no evidence of aversion to disadvantageous inequality on either religious sample. Both Muslim and Hindu participants display aversion to advantageous inequality in both fragmented villages and homogeneous villages. The effect of village fragmentation on aversion to disadvantageous inequality differs across religious groups.
Abstract.
DOI.
Steffens NK, Fonseca MA, Ryan MK, Rink FA, Stoker JI, Nederveen Pieterse A (2018). How feedback about leadership potential impacts ambition, organizational commitment, and performance.
Leadership Quarterly,
29(6), 637-647.
Abstract:
How feedback about leadership potential impacts ambition, organizational commitment, and performance
In the present research we report results from two experimental studies that examine how feedback about leadership potential impacts leadership ambition, organizational commitment, and performance. Study 1 used an experimental vignette methodology that controls for prior performance. Results show that individuals who receive feedback that they have low potential to be a future leader have lower ambition and organizational commitment relative to those who receive feedback that they have high potential to be a future leader. Study 2 provides evidence of the causal behavioral effects of feedback about leadership potential using a real task effort environment. Results show that participants informed to be unlikely future leaders display lower performance in a subsequent task than participants informed to be likely future leaders. The findings from the two studies demonstrate that information about leadership potential affects subsequent ambition to become leaders as well as performance. We discuss the implications of these findings for the importance of followership, talent management, and leadership succession.
Abstract.
DOI.
Fonseca M, Normann HT, Li Y (2018). Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence — experimental evidence.
Southern Economic Journal DOI.
Fonseca MA, Peters K (2018). Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust.
Games and Economic Behavior,
107, 253-281.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Grimshaw SB (2017). Do Behavioral Nudges in Prepopulated Tax Forms Affect Compliance? Experimental Evidence with Real Taxpayers.
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing,
36(2), 213-226.
Abstract:
Do Behavioral Nudges in Prepopulated Tax Forms Affect Compliance? Experimental Evidence with Real Taxpayers
Defaults, in the form of prepopulated fields within the tax form, have been identified as potential mechanisms that tax authorities can use to reduce noncompliance. They achieve this by simplifying the process of filing taxes, thus reducing the scope for errors. However, defaults may increase the scope for evasion if set incorrectly. The authors report experimental data on the effect of correct and incorrect defaults. They find that prepopulating tax returns is a worthwhile policy only if it is done with highly reliable information. Setting default levels that underestimate taxpayers’ true tax liability leads to significant drops in compliance and tax revenue. The authors also study whether nudges that contain messages with descriptive norms about compliance can mitigate the adverse effect of prepopulated returns with incorrect values. Nudges that react to inputs from the taxpayer effectively raise compliance, whereas static nudges do not. This result demonstrates the limits to the applicability of nudges in a public policy sphere as well as possible adverse effects resulting from poor implementation.
Abstract.
DOI.
Choo CYL, Fonseca MA, Myles GD (2016). Do students behave like real taxpayers in the lab? Evidence from a real effort tax compliance experiment.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
124, 102-114.
DOI.
Gonçalves R, Fonseca MA (2016). Learning through Simultaneous Play: Evidence from Penny Auctions.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
25(4), 1040-1059.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Ghosh S, Marjit S (2016). Religious Fragmentation, Social Identity and Conflict: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment in India.
PLOS ONE,
11(10), e0164708-e0164708.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Ghosh S, Marjit S (2016). Religious fragmentation, social identity and cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India.
European Economic Review,
90, 265-279.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Chakravarty S (2015). Discrimination via Exclusion: an Experiment on Group Identity and Club Goods.
Journal of Public Economic Theory DOI.
Kurz T, Thomas WE, Fonseca MA (2014). A fine is a more effective financial deterrent when framed retributively and extracted publicly.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
54, 170-177.
Abstract:
A fine is a more effective financial deterrent when framed retributively and extracted publicly
Introducing monetary fines to decrease an undesired behavior can sometimes have the counterintuitive effect of increasing the prevalence of the behavior being targeted. Such findings raise important social psychological questions in relation to both the way in which financial penalties are framed and the social contexts in which they are administered. In a field experiment (Study 1), we informed participants who had signed up for an experiment that they would be fined if they arrived late. This fine was presented as either compensatory or retributive in nature and as being administered either privately or publicly. We then observed participants’ subsequent arrival time. In accordance with our hypotheses, participants’ punctuality was only improved (relative to a no-fine control) in response to retributive rather than compensatory fines and when told that fines would be administered publicly rather than privately. In Study 2 we used a scenario method to demonstrate that the greater efficacy of retributively framed fines can be attributed to their presence being less likely to undermine the perceived immorality of transgression than is the case for compensatory fines. We propose a material promotion-moral prevention (MPMP) theory to account for our findings and consider its practical implications for the use of financial disincentives to encourage cooperative behavior through public policy in domains such as climate change.
Abstract.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Kaplan TR (2014). An Experiment on the Causes of Bank Run Contagions.
European Economic Review,
72, 39-51.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Normann HT (2014). Endogenous Cartel Formation: Experimental Evidence. Economics Letters, 125(2), 223-225.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA (2014). The Effect of Social Fragmentation on Public Good Provision: an Experimental Study. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 53, 1-9.
Fonseca MA, Normann H-T (2013). Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
169(2), 199-199.
DOI.
Hueffer K, Fonseca MA, Leiserowitz A, Taylor KM (2013). The wisdom of crowds: Predicting a weather and climate-related event. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(2), 91-105.
Peters K, Haslam SA, Ryan MK, Fonseca M (2013). Working with Subgroup Identities to Build Organizational Identification and Support for Organizational Strategy: a Test of the ASPIRe Model.
Group and Organization Management,
38(1), 128-144.
Abstract:
Working with Subgroup Identities to Build Organizational Identification and Support for Organizational Strategy: a Test of the ASPIRe Model
A growing body of evidence indicates that organizational identification underpins a range of important organizational outcomes. However, to date, the literature has provided little empirically grounded guidance for organizations that are trying to develop organizational identification among their employees. In this article, the authors aim to address this lacuna by testing the effectiveness of the ASPIRe (Actualizing Social and Personal Identity Resources) model-a model that specifies a sequence of structured activities designed to use subgroup identities as a platform for building organizational identification-in a bespoke workshop delivered to senior military health services personnel. As predicted by the ASPIRe model, participants reported increased levels of subgroup and organizational identification as a result of the workshop and were also more supportive of the organization's strategy. © the Author(s) 2012.
Abstract.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Pfaff A, Osgood D (2012). An Advantage of Resource Queues over Spot Markets: Decision Coordination in Experiments with Resource Uncertainty.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
94(5), 1136-1153.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Normann HT (2012). Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – the Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments.
European Economic Review,
56, 1759-1772.
DOI.
Fonseca MA (2009). An Experimental Investigation of Asymmetric Contests.
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
27(5), 582-591.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Normann HT (2008). Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion: Experimental Evidence.
Economic Journal,
118, 387-400.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Normann HT, Mueller W (2006). Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence.
International Journal of Game Theory,
34, 443-456.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Huck S (2005). Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn't: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost.
Economic Theory,
25, 669-677.
DOI.
Chapters
Peters K, Fonseca MA, Haslam SA, Steffens NK, Quiggin J (2019). Fat cats and thin followers: Excessive CEO pay may reduce ability to lead. In (Ed)
The Social Psychology of Inequality, 21-34.
DOI.
Publications by year
In Press
Fonseca MA, Makris M, Giovannoni F (In Press). Auctions with External Incentives: Experimental Evidence. International Journal of Game Theory
Fonseca MA, Chen J, Zhang X (In Press). How Much will Climate Change Reduce Productivity in a High-Technology Supply Chain? Evidence from Silicon Wafer Manufacturing. Environmental and Resource Economics
Fonseca M, Peters K (In Press). Is it Costly to Deceive? People Are Adept at Detecting Gossipers’ Lies but May Not Reward Honesty. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Chakravarty S, Choo L, Fonseca M, Kaplan T (In Press). Should regulators always be transparent? a bank run experiment. European Economic Review
Fonseca MA, Rahimi L (In Press). The effects of income windfalls on labour supply and tax compliance: experimental evidence. Review of Behavioral Economics
2022
Fonseca MA, Gonçalves R, Pinho J, Tabacco GA (2022). How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? an experiment.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
204, 643-662.
DOI.
2021
Fonseca MA, Gonçalves R, Pinho J, Tabacco G (2021). How Do Antitrust Regimes Impact on Cartel Formation and Managers’ Labor Market? an Experiment.
DOI.
Chen JC, Fonseca MA, Grimshaw SB (2021). When a nudge is (not) enough: Experiments on social information and incentives.
European Economic Review,
134, 103711-103711.
DOI.
2020
Auerbach JU, Fonseca MA (2020). Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement.
Games and Economic Behavior,
122, 130-149.
DOI.
Peters K, Fonseca MA (2020). Truth, Lies and Gossip.
Psychological Science DOI.
2019
Fonseca MA (2019). Endogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidence.
Studies in Microeconomics,
7(1), 59-74.
Abstract:
Endogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidence
This paper presents experimental evidence on the action commitment game with cost-asymmetric firms in a differentiated-products Bertrand duopoly. Unlike its quantity-setting counterpart, the risk-dominant leader–follower equilibrium Pareto dominates the simultaneous-move equilibrium. This equilibrium also minimizes payoff differences between firms. Hence, one would expect the model to accurately capture behavior. The evidence partially supports the theory: low-cost firms price in the first period more often than high-cost firms, and depending on the treatment, between 40 and 57 per cent of all observations conform to equilibrium play. However, the modal timing outcome involved both firms delaying their pricing decision. This timing outcome is characterized by Nash play and some collusion. The high frequency of delaying decisions could be due to a desire to reduce strategic uncertainty.
Abstract.
DOI.
Peters K, Fonseca MA, Haslam SA, Steffens NK, Quiggin J (2019). Fat cats and thin followers: Excessive CEO pay may reduce ability to lead. In (Ed)
The Social Psychology of Inequality, 21-34.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Ghosh S, Kumar P, Marjit S (2019). Religious fragmentation, social identity and other-regarding preferences: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India.
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics,
82Abstract:
Religious fragmentation, social identity and other-regarding preferences: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India
We examine the impact of religious identity and village-level religious fragmentation on other-regarding preferences. We report on a series of two-player binary Dictator experiments conducted on a sample of 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural West Bengal, India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of religious fragmentation in the village where subjects reside. Both Muslims’ and Hindus’ aversion to advantageous inequality declines as the probability of facing an out-group member increases. We find no evidence of aversion to disadvantageous inequality on either religious sample. Both Muslim and Hindu participants display aversion to advantageous inequality in both fragmented villages and homogeneous villages. The effect of village fragmentation on aversion to disadvantageous inequality differs across religious groups.
Abstract.
DOI.
2018
Steffens NK, Fonseca MA, Ryan MK, Rink FA, Stoker JI, Nederveen Pieterse A (2018). How feedback about leadership potential impacts ambition, organizational commitment, and performance.
Leadership Quarterly,
29(6), 637-647.
Abstract:
How feedback about leadership potential impacts ambition, organizational commitment, and performance
In the present research we report results from two experimental studies that examine how feedback about leadership potential impacts leadership ambition, organizational commitment, and performance. Study 1 used an experimental vignette methodology that controls for prior performance. Results show that individuals who receive feedback that they have low potential to be a future leader have lower ambition and organizational commitment relative to those who receive feedback that they have high potential to be a future leader. Study 2 provides evidence of the causal behavioral effects of feedback about leadership potential using a real task effort environment. Results show that participants informed to be unlikely future leaders display lower performance in a subsequent task than participants informed to be likely future leaders. The findings from the two studies demonstrate that information about leadership potential affects subsequent ambition to become leaders as well as performance. We discuss the implications of these findings for the importance of followership, talent management, and leadership succession.
Abstract.
DOI.
Fonseca M, Normann HT, Li Y (2018). Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence — experimental evidence.
Southern Economic Journal DOI.
Fonseca MA, Peters K (2018). Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust.
Games and Economic Behavior,
107, 253-281.
DOI.
2017
Fonseca MA, Grimshaw SB (2017). Do Behavioral Nudges in Prepopulated Tax Forms Affect Compliance? Experimental Evidence with Real Taxpayers.
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing,
36(2), 213-226.
Abstract:
Do Behavioral Nudges in Prepopulated Tax Forms Affect Compliance? Experimental Evidence with Real Taxpayers
Defaults, in the form of prepopulated fields within the tax form, have been identified as potential mechanisms that tax authorities can use to reduce noncompliance. They achieve this by simplifying the process of filing taxes, thus reducing the scope for errors. However, defaults may increase the scope for evasion if set incorrectly. The authors report experimental data on the effect of correct and incorrect defaults. They find that prepopulating tax returns is a worthwhile policy only if it is done with highly reliable information. Setting default levels that underestimate taxpayers’ true tax liability leads to significant drops in compliance and tax revenue. The authors also study whether nudges that contain messages with descriptive norms about compliance can mitigate the adverse effect of prepopulated returns with incorrect values. Nudges that react to inputs from the taxpayer effectively raise compliance, whereas static nudges do not. This result demonstrates the limits to the applicability of nudges in a public policy sphere as well as possible adverse effects resulting from poor implementation.
Abstract.
DOI.
2016
Choo CYL, Fonseca MA, Myles GD (2016). Do students behave like real taxpayers in the lab? Evidence from a real effort tax compliance experiment.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
124, 102-114.
DOI.
Gonçalves R, Fonseca MA (2016). Learning through Simultaneous Play: Evidence from Penny Auctions.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
25(4), 1040-1059.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Ghosh S, Marjit S (2016). Religious Fragmentation, Social Identity and Conflict: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment in India.
PLOS ONE,
11(10), e0164708-e0164708.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Ghosh S, Marjit S (2016). Religious fragmentation, social identity and cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India.
European Economic Review,
90, 265-279.
DOI.
2015
Fonseca MA, Chakravarty S (2015). Discrimination via Exclusion: an Experiment on Group Identity and Club Goods.
Journal of Public Economic Theory DOI.
2014
Kurz T, Thomas WE, Fonseca MA (2014). A fine is a more effective financial deterrent when framed retributively and extracted publicly.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
54, 170-177.
Abstract:
A fine is a more effective financial deterrent when framed retributively and extracted publicly
Introducing monetary fines to decrease an undesired behavior can sometimes have the counterintuitive effect of increasing the prevalence of the behavior being targeted. Such findings raise important social psychological questions in relation to both the way in which financial penalties are framed and the social contexts in which they are administered. In a field experiment (Study 1), we informed participants who had signed up for an experiment that they would be fined if they arrived late. This fine was presented as either compensatory or retributive in nature and as being administered either privately or publicly. We then observed participants’ subsequent arrival time. In accordance with our hypotheses, participants’ punctuality was only improved (relative to a no-fine control) in response to retributive rather than compensatory fines and when told that fines would be administered publicly rather than privately. In Study 2 we used a scenario method to demonstrate that the greater efficacy of retributively framed fines can be attributed to their presence being less likely to undermine the perceived immorality of transgression than is the case for compensatory fines. We propose a material promotion-moral prevention (MPMP) theory to account for our findings and consider its practical implications for the use of financial disincentives to encourage cooperative behavior through public policy in domains such as climate change.
Abstract.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Kaplan TR (2014). An Experiment on the Causes of Bank Run Contagions.
European Economic Review,
72, 39-51.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Normann HT (2014). Endogenous Cartel Formation: Experimental Evidence. Economics Letters, 125(2), 223-225.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA (2014). The Effect of Social Fragmentation on Public Good Provision: an Experimental Study. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 53, 1-9.
2013
Fonseca MA, Normann H-T (2013). Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
169(2), 199-199.
DOI.
Hueffer K, Fonseca MA, Leiserowitz A, Taylor KM (2013). The wisdom of crowds: Predicting a weather and climate-related event. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(2), 91-105.
Peters K, Haslam SA, Ryan MK, Fonseca M (2013). Working with Subgroup Identities to Build Organizational Identification and Support for Organizational Strategy: a Test of the ASPIRe Model.
Group and Organization Management,
38(1), 128-144.
Abstract:
Working with Subgroup Identities to Build Organizational Identification and Support for Organizational Strategy: a Test of the ASPIRe Model
A growing body of evidence indicates that organizational identification underpins a range of important organizational outcomes. However, to date, the literature has provided little empirically grounded guidance for organizations that are trying to develop organizational identification among their employees. In this article, the authors aim to address this lacuna by testing the effectiveness of the ASPIRe (Actualizing Social and Personal Identity Resources) model-a model that specifies a sequence of structured activities designed to use subgroup identities as a platform for building organizational identification-in a bespoke workshop delivered to senior military health services personnel. As predicted by the ASPIRe model, participants reported increased levels of subgroup and organizational identification as a result of the workshop and were also more supportive of the organization's strategy. © the Author(s) 2012.
Abstract.
DOI.
2012
Fonseca MA, Pfaff A, Osgood D (2012). An Advantage of Resource Queues over Spot Markets: Decision Coordination in Experiments with Resource Uncertainty.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
94(5), 1136-1153.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Normann HT (2012). Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – the Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments.
European Economic Review,
56, 1759-1772.
DOI.
2011
Fonseca MA, Pfaff A, Osgood DE (2011). Efficiency Gains from Pre-Investment Resource Queues: Coordinating Investment Under Resource Uncertainty.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Normann H-T (2011). Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion - the Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments.
DOI.
2009
Fonseca MA (2009). An Experimental Investigation of Asymmetric Contests.
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
27(5), 582-591.
DOI.
2008
Fonseca MA, Normann HT (2008). Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion: Experimental Evidence.
Economic Journal,
118, 387-400.
DOI.
2007
Fonseca MA, Normann H-T (2007). Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion: Experimental Evidence.
DOI.
2006
Fonseca MA, Normann HT, Mueller W (2006). Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence.
International Journal of Game Theory,
34, 443-456.
DOI.
2005
Fonseca MA, Müller W, Normann H-T (2005). Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence.
DOI.
Fonseca MA, Huck S (2005). Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn't: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost.
Economic Theory,
25, 669-677.
DOI.