Strategy Similarity and Coordination
|Speaker:||Rajiv Sarin, Texas A&M University|
|Date:||Monday 21 October 2002|
|Location:||Room 106 Streatam Court|
(with Farshid Vahid)
This paper introduces similarity among strategies in the payoff assessment model of choice (Sarin and Vahid (1999,GEB)). The assessments of strategies that are more similar to the chosen strategy are updated more similarly to the chosen strategy. We use this model to explain a recent experiment. The coordination game repeatedly played by the experimental subjects had two symmetric, efficient and strict stage game Nash equilibria. In the experiment, the subjects always converged to play one of these equilibria, and converged to this equilibrium remarkably fast. The model we propose converges to choose the same equilibrium, and does so in roughly the same number of repetitions. Statistical tests are performed to distinguish between the payoff distributions generated by the model and the observed payoff distributions.