Cooperation and Competition: Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in Symmetric Games
|Speaker:||Alex Possajennikov, University of Nottingham|
|Date:||Friday 24 October 2003|
|Location:||Room 106 Streatam Court|
Agents in a large population are randomly matched to play a certain game, payoff in which represent fitness. Agents may have preferences that are different from fitness. They learn strategies according to their preferences, and evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the opponent in a match, only efficient strategy profiles can be stable. However, in prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games no profiles are stable. Computer simulations are used to determine what may happen in such games. When agents do not know the preferences of the opponent, only Nash equilibria of the fitness game can be stable. The presentation is based on the papers "Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in Symmetric Games" and "Cooperation and Competition: Learning of Strategies and Evolution of Preferences in Prisoners' Dilemma and Hawk-Dove Games".