Do Women Anticipate Discrimination? Experimental Evidence
|Speaker:||Angela Sanchez Gonzalez, University of Exeter|
|Date: ||Tuesday 5 December 2017|
|Location: ||Syndicate Room C, Building One|
This paper studies experimentally whether men and women react strategically to anticipated potential discrimination in a labor-market setting and how this depends on the task they perform. Participants are assigned to a seven-people group and randomly allocated a role as a firm or worker. In each group, there are five workers and two firms. Firms decide which worker to hire to perform a task in a second stage. The only information firms have about each worker is an avatar representing the worker’s gender. Before firms making their decision, the workers must choose the avatar (male, female or neutral) that represents them in the market. Results show that when workers are hired to do a mathematical task (adding five two-digits numbers), women behave strategically and only 36% reveal their real gender. However, when the task is not mathematical or when there is uncertainty regarding the task, women change their behavior and almost 70% of them reveal their true gender. Results also show that males behave in a less strategic way than women and most of them reveal their true gender, regardless of the task.