The prize is awarded annually to the best paper in the fields of Experimental Economics, Decision Theory and Behavioural Economics.
Michal Bauer and Vojtěch Bartoš, 2017 winners of the Exeter Prize
David V. Budescu and Eva Chen, 2016 winners of the Exeter Prize
Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez and Francesco Feri, 2015 winners of the Exeter Prize
Tomasz Strzalecki, 2014 winner of the Exeter Prize
Daniel Friedman, 2013 winner of the Exeter Prize
Michel Regenwetter, 2012 winner of the Exeter Prize
Exeter Prize for Research in Experimental Economics, Decision Theory and Behavioral Economics
The Exeter Prize is awarded to the best paper published in the previous calendar year in a peer-reviewed journal in the fields of Experimental Economics, Decision Theory and Behavioural Economics. Papers qualify under one of the following categories:
- Any paper that involves either lab or field experiments.
- Any purely theoretical paper that involves "behavioral" theory (for example, non-expected utility).
- Any empirical work that shows evidence for behavioral models (that fit under 2) or tests/rejects models (that fit under 2).
Exeter Prize 2018
We are happy to announce the winner of the 2018 Exeter Prize for the best paper published in the previous calendar year in a peer-reviewed journal in the fields of Experimental Economics, Behavioural Economics and Decision Theory.
The winner is Shengwu Li (Harvard University) for his paper “Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms”, published in the American Economic Review.
The paper proposes and analyzes a desirable property for mechanisms implementing social outcomes. A mechanism is a game whose rules are designed by a social planner for the purpose of implementing a certain desirable social outcome (e.g., efficiency or fairness). Such mechanisms are always designed under the assumption that the parties involved will play an equilibrium outcome. Strategy Proof mechanisms received special attention in the literature, because they implement an outcome that is not only an equilibrium, but also one with dominant strategies, i.e., no player can do anything better than playing the strategy that leads to the socially desirable outcome, no matter what other people are doing. Yet as experimental and empirical results have shown, in real life, strategy proof mechanisms don’t always guarantee that players will do what they are expected to do. This is mainly because the reasoning behind the “right thing to do” is often complicated even in cases that admit a dominant-strategy equilibrium (one prominent mechanism of this sort is the second-price auction). Li’s paper proposes a concept of “obvious mechanisms.” This mechanism not only admits a dominant-strategy equilibrium, but also guarantees that it is cognitively simple to confirm that playing anything else is irrational. Li’s approach allows us to make mechanism design theory more applicable, and closer to reality. It warns us against choosing social mechanisms that we as game theorists hold to be secure, but when applied in the real-world will prove to be too complicated for people to do the right thing.
The winning paper was selected by the panel of Rosemarie Nagel (Pompeu Fabra University), Michel Regenwetter (University of Illinois) and Eyal Winter (Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Lancaster University)
Other 2018 Finalists
Chew, Soo Hong, Bin Miao, and Songfa Zhong. "Partial ambiguity." Econometrica 85.4 (2017): 1239-1260.
Glover, Dylan, Amanda Pallais, and William Pariente. "Discrimination as a self-fulfilling prophecy: Evidence from French grocery stores." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132.3 (2017): 1219-1260.
Kessler, Judd B. "Announcements of support and public good provision." American Economic Review 107.12 (2017): 3760-87.
Previous prize winners
The winners of the 2017 Exeter Prize are Vojtěch Bartoš (LMU), Michal Bauer (CERGE-EI), Julie Chytilová (FSV-CUNI), and Filip Matějka (CERGE-EI) for their paper "Attention Discrimination: Theory and Field Experiments with Monitoring Information Acquisition", published in the American Economic Review.
The paper proposes a theory of discrimination in which levels of attention to information about applicants to a market depend both on whether the applicant is a member of an “attractive” group and on the structural features of the market. Methodologically, it seeks to test theory about the processes leading to observed outcomes with enhanced measurement tools, rather than rely solely on comparative static predictions that neglect those processes. Field experiments complement prior laboratory research into the processes of selective attention, and span rental housing and labor markets in the Czech Republic and Germany. The results support some core hypotheses about discrimination, and raise nuanced hypotheses for future normative research.
The winning paper was selected by the panel of Glenn Harrison (Georgia State University), Michael Mandler (Royal Holloway, University of London), and Michel Regenwetter (University of Illinois).
Other 2017 finalists
- Arthur E. Attema, Han Bleichrodt, Yu Gao, Zhenxing Huang and Peter P. Wakker. "Measuring discounting without measuring utility." published in American Economic Review.
- Stefano Ballieti, Robert L. Goldstone and Dirk Helbing. "Peer review and competition in the Art Exhibition Game." published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
- Daniel L. Chen, Tobias J. Moskowitz and Kelly Shue. "Decision making under the gambler’s fallacy: evidence from asylum judges, loan officers, and baseball umpires." published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
- Cary Frydman and Colin F. Camerer. "Neural evidence of regret and its implications for investment behavior." published in the Review of Financial Studies.
The winners of the Exeter Prize 2016 for Research in Experimental Economics, Decision Theory and Behavioral Economics are David V. Budescu (Fordham University) and Eva Chen (University of Pennsylvania) for their paper “Identifying Expertise to Extract the Wisdom of the Crowds”, Management Science, 61(2), 2015, 267-280.
How can one more accurately predict a future event, by asking many people or by seeking the advice of a few experts? This paper examines a middle ground between reliance on quantity (a crowd) and quality (experts). Since Condorcet’s work on the mathematical theory of voting in the 18th century, scholars have considered the idea that, collectively, we can cancel out individual biases and make better decisions under certain conditions and ways of aggregating individual opinions.
What is now known as the “wisdom of the crowds” refers to the ability of a large group to outperform individuals in tasks such as predicting a future event. At the same time, the natural appeal of expert judges lies in their specialized skill sets and their superior knowledge of a given domain. This paper develops a method for incorporating the wisdom of the crowds with expertise by identifying experts in a crowd and measuring their contribution to the crowd’s overall performance.
The proposed method, based on the simple idea of attributing higher weight to well performing experts, is tested in a large scale empirical study and exhibits a good performance. This paper will likely stimulate further research to improve the method. For example, possible refinements may take into account the incentives and strategic considerations of experts to report their beliefs truthfully.
The winning paper was selected by the panel of Glenn Harrison (Georgia State University), Michel Regenwetter (University of Illinois), and Shmuel Zamir (Hebrew University and the University of Exeter).
Other 2016 finalists
- Apesteguia, Jose, and Miguel A. Ballester. "A measure of rationality and welfare." Journal of Political Economy 123, no. 6 (2015): 1278-1310.
- Krajbich, Ian, Björn Bartling, Todd Hare, and Ernst Fehr. "Rethinking fast and slow based on a critique of reaction-time reverse inference." Nature Communications 6 (2015).
- Plonsky, Ori, Kinneret Teodorescu, and Ido Erev. "Reliance on small samples, the wavy recency effect, and similarity-based learning." Psychological Review 122, no. 4 (2015): 621.
- Powdthavee, Nattavudh, and Yohanes E. Riyanto. "Would you pay for transparently useless advice? A test of boundaries of beliefs in the folly of predictions." Review of Economics and Statistics 97, no. 2 (2015): 257-272.
The winners of the Exeter Prize 2015 for Research in Experimental Economics, Decision Theory and Behavioral Economics are Gary Charness (UCSB) , Francesco Feri (Royal Holloway), Miguel Melendez (Malaga), and Matthias Sutter (Cologne and Innsbruck) for their paper "Experimental games on networks: underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection" published in Econometrica in 2014.
This paper provides a balanced portfolio of theory, experimental design, and the pursuit of alternative explanations for behavioral puzzles. Considering designs that span a wide range of interesting networks, they find that theory predicts behavior tightly when there is a unique equilibrium. And when there are multiple equilibria, traditional characteristics describing the network play an important role in describing behavior. Their study establishes a careful, informed behavioral base from which further research into network behavior will proceed.
The winning paper was selected by the panel of Glenn Harrison (Georgia State University), David Budescu (Fordham University), and Shmuel Zamir (Hebrew University and the University of Exeter). Francesco and Miguel visited the University of Exeter in November 2014, presented their current research on the topic and received the award.
Other 2015 finalists
- Bursztyn, Leonardo, Florian Ederer, Bruno Ferman, and Noam Yuchtman. "Understanding mechanisms underlying peer effects: Evidence from a field experiment on financial decisions" published in Econometrica.
- Coffman, Katherine Baldiga. "Evidence on Self-Stereotyping and the Contribution of Ideas" published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
- Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. "Expected uncertain utility theory", published in Econometrica.
The winner of the Exeter Prize 2014 for Research in Experimental Economics, Decision Theory and Behavioral Economics is Tomasz Strzalecki (Harvard University) for his paper "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Models of Ambiguity Aversion" published in Econometrica in 2013.
Other 2014 finalists
- Barseghyan, L., Molinari, F., O'Donoghue, T. and Teitelbaum, J. 2013. "The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Insurance Choices." American Economic Review 103(6), 2499-2529.
- Gurdal, M.Y., Miller, J.B., and Rustichini, A. 2013. "Why Blame?" Journal of Political Economy 121 (6), 1204-1247.
- Sah, S., Lowenstein, G., and Cain, D. 2013. "The Burden of Disclosure: Increased Compliance With Distrusted Advice." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 104(2), 289-304.
- Sonnemann, U., Camerer, C.F., Fox, C.R., and Langer, T. 2013. "How Psychological Framing Affects Economic Market Prices in the Lab and Field." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (29), 11779-11784.
The winners of the Exeter Prize 2013 for Research in Experimental Economics, Decision Theory and Behavioral Economics are Daniel Friedman, (UC Santa Cruz) and Ryan Oprea (UC Santa Barbara) for their paper "A Continuous Dilemma" by published in American Economic Review in 2012.
Other 2013 finalists
- “Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility”, by Bjorn Bartling and Urs Fischbacher in the Review of Economic Studies
- “The Behavioralist Visits the Factory: Increasing Productivity Using Simple Framing Manipulations”, by Tanjim Hossain and John List in Management Science.
- “Social Sampling Explains Apparent Biases in Judgments of Social Environments”, Mirta Galesic, Henrik Ollsson & Jorg Rieskamp in Psychological Science
- “Revealed Attention”, by Yusufcan Masatliogu, Daisuke Nakajima and Erkut Ozbay in the American Economic Review
- “Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets”, by Ariel Rubinstein and Yuval Salant in the Review of Economic Studies
The winner of the inaugural Exeter Prize 2012 for Research in Experimental Economics, Decision Theory and Behavioral Economics is "Transitivity of Preferences" by Michel Regenwetter, Jason Dana and Clintin P. Davis-Stober, published in Psychological Review in 2011.
Other 2012 finalists
- “Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences and Gender” by Thomas Dohmen and Armin Falk published in American Economic Review.
- “Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes” by Devin Pope and Maurice Schweitzer published in the American Economic Review.
- “Judicial In-Group Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism” by Moses Shayo and Asaf Zussman published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
- “Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences” by Tomasz Strzalecki published in Econometrica.