Behaviour, Identity and Decisions research cluster

'Strategic Interaction/Institutions' theme

We study strategic behaviour when a number of agents interact and analyse the effects of changing the structure/mechanism of how such interactions take place.

This includes the study of auctions, product differentiation, the design of contracts and the role of institutions and reputation.

Researchers:

  • Surajeet Chakravarty
  • Kaustav Das
  • Miguel Fonseca
  • Brit Grosskopf
  • Todd Kaplan
  • David Kelsey
  • David Reinstein
  • Rajiv Sarin

Selected publications

  • Chatterjee K, Das K (2015). Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the “law of one price”. International Journal of Game Theory, 44(4), 949-991
  • Gonçalves, R. and Fonseca, M.A. 2016. “Learning From Simultaneous Play: Evidence From Penny Auctions.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, doi: 10.1111/jems.12174.
  • Grosskopf, B. and R. Sarin, 2010. “Is Reputation Good or Bad? An Experiment,"American Economic Review, 100, 2010, 2187-2204.
  • Grosskopf, B. and A. Roth, 2009. “If you were offered the Right of First Refusal, Should you Accept? An Experimental Investigation of Contract Design," Games and Economic Behavior, 65, 2009, 176-204.
  • Fonseca, M.A. and Normann, H.T. 2014. “Endogenous Cartel Formation: Experimental Evidence.” Economics Letters, vol. 125(2), pp. 223-225.
  • Chakravarty, S., Fonseca, M.A. and Kaplan, T.R. 2014 “An Experiment on the Causes of Bank Run Contagions.” European Economic Review, vol. 72, pp.39-51.
  • Hueffer, K., Fonseca, M.A., Leiserowitz, A., and Taylor, K.M. 2013. “The wisdom of crowds: Predicting a weather and climate-related event.” Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 8(2), pp. 91-105.
  • Fonseca, M.A., and Normann, H.T. 2013. “Excess Capacity and Competition in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 169(2), pp. 199-228.
  • Fonseca, M.A., Pfaff, A., and Osgood, D. 2012. “An Advantage of Resource Queues over Spot Markets: Decision Coordination in Experiments with Resource Uncertainty.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics vol. 94(5), pp. 1136-1153.
  • Fonseca, M.A. 2009. “An Experimental Investigation of Asymmetric Contests.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, pp. 582-591.
  • Fonseca, M.A., and Normann, H.T. 2008. “Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion: Experimental Evidence.” Economic Journal, vol. 118, pp. 387‐ 400.
  • Fonseca, M.A., Müller, W., and Normann, H.T. 2006. “Endogenous Timing with Observable Delay: Experimental Evidence.” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 34(3), pp. 443-456.
  • Fonseca, M.A., Huck, S., and Normann, H.T. 2005. “Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn’t: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost.” Economic Theory, vol 25(3), pp. 669-677.
  • Kaplan, T. and D. Wettstein, 2015. "The Optimal Design of Rewards in Contests," (with David Wettstein). Review of Economic Design, 19 (4) 327-339
  • Eichberger J., Kelsey, D. and B. Schipper, 2009."Ambiguity and Social Interaction", Oxford Economic Papers, 61, 355-379.
  • David Reinstein and Chris M. Snyder, ‘The Influence of Expert Reviews on Consumer Demand for Experience Goods: A Case Study of Movie Critics”, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 53. No. 1, pp 27-51 (March 2005). Cartoon.
  • Reinstein, D. and J. Song (2012), “Efficient Consumer Altruism and Fair Trade” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 21
 Number 1.

Grants

2016-2017 (£32,600, Philip Stern) Understanding Procurement Behaviours: ESRC IAA Co-Creation award with the Crown Commercial Service which is an executive agency of the Cabinet Office responsible for providing commercial services to the public sector and improving government commercial and procurement activity. The Cabinet Office is a department of the Government of the United Kingdom.

The aim of this ESRC project is to explore ways of helping to meet the 33% procurement target for SMEs by 2020.