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Blockholder Exit Threats and Financial Reporting Quality


Speaker:Ole-Kristian Hope, University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management
Date: Wednesday 9 April 2014
Time: 14:00
Location: Streatham Court Lecture Theatre B

Further details

Blockholder Exit Threats and Financial Reporting Quality

Yiwei Dou

New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law

Ole-Kristian Hope

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Wayne B. Thomas

University of Oklahoma - Michael F. Price College of Business

Youli Zou

George Washington University - Department of Accountancy

January 4, 2014

Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2374770


Recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that blockholders (shareholders with ownership ≥ 5%) exert governance through the threat of exit. These shareholders have strong incentives to gather private information and sell their shares when managers are perceived to underperform. To prevent blockholders from selling their shares and the firm from suffering a stock price decline, managers align their actions with the interests of shareholders. As a result, these managers are expected to have fewer incentives to conceal their activities and are less likely to manage earnings. Consistent with these predictions from economic theory, we find evidence that as exit threat increases, firms have higher financial reporting quality. Furthermore, the impact of blockholders’ exit threat on financial reporting quality increases as the manager’s wealth is tied more closely to the stock price. Our study contributes to the research on the impact of shareholders on financial reporting quality and to an emerging literature on the impact of blockholders in financial markets. Blockholders play an important role in managers’ reporting outcomes through their actions as informed investors.


working papers series