Social Conformity in Games with Many Players

Economics

Speaker:Myrna Wooders, University of Warwick
Date: Friday 10 October 2003
Time: 16:15
Location: Room 106 Streatam Court

Further details

(with Edward Cartwright and Reinhard Selten)

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to imitate similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such imitation can be consistent with self-interested behavior. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash equilibrium that induces the partition of the player set into relatively few groups of similar individuals playing the same or similar strategies. In this paper we define and characterize a family of games admitting existence of approximate Nash equilibria in pure strategies that induce partitions of the player set with the desired properties. We also introduce the Conley-Wooders concept of 'crowding' types' into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player and those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others - and his tastes, taken to directly affect only that player. With the assumption of 'within crowding type anonymity' and 'convexity' of taste-types' assumption we show that the number of groups can be uniformly bounded.