Seminar
Preferred bidders, curse in a simultaneous ascending auction
Economics
Speaker: | Dan Sasaki, University of Tokio |
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Date: | Thursday 11 March 2004 |
Time: | 16:15 |
Location: | Room 106 Streatam Court |
Further details
In this paper we try shedding light on the two popular questions on spectrum licensing auctions : [1] whether any geographical synergies between licences can be detected, and if so, what would be possible alternatives and pros and cons thereof, and [2] whether the provision of entrants-only licences truly serve to protect new (hence less established) entrants and encourage their participation. Our empirical analysis on [1] is mixed and inconclusive, leaving some concerns on the broadly adopted auction mechanism that ignores any potential synergistic interlink between geographically adjacent licences. The Australian data also serves to cast a fresh doubt against [2], which we follow up by a simple theoretical discussion.