A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences
|Speaker:||Hans Normann, Royal Holloway|
|Date:||Friday 24 February 2006|
|Location:||Lecture Room D, Streatham Court|
In this paper we assess the predictive power of inequity aversion. We run four di¤erent experiments (an ultimatum game, a dictator game, a sequential prisoner’s dilemma and a public-good game) with the same cohort of experimental subjects. This allows us to make intra-personal comparisons across the four games. We use the responder data from the ultimatum game in order to estimate a parameter of negative inequity aversion, and we take data from a modi…ed dictator game to estimate a parameter of positive inequity aversion. We then use this joint distribution to test several hypotheses about individual behavior in the other games. Our results show that the inequity aversion model has considerable predictive power at the aggregate level but fails almost entirely at the individual level.