Seminar
Common reasoning in games (with Robert Sugden)
Economics
Speaker: | Robin Cubitt, University of Nottingham |
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Website: | http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/Economics/People/robin.cubitt |
Date: | Friday 9 June 2006 |
Time: | 16:15 |
Location: | Lecture Room D, Streatham Court |
Further details
The game-theoretic assumption of ‘common knowledge of rationality’ leads to paradoxes when rationality is represented in a Bayesian framework as cautious expected utility maximization with independent beliefs (ICEU). We diagnose and resolve these paradoxes by presenting a new class of formal models of players’ reasoning in which the analogue of common knowledge is provability in common reason. We show that a range of standards of decision-theoretic practical rationality can be assumed without inconsistency to be provable in common reason in models of this class. We investigate the implications arising when the standard of decision-theoretic rationality so assumed is ICEU.