Conflict in the Pool
|Speaker:||Marco Faravelli, University of Queensland|
|Date: ||Friday 27 September 2019|
|Time: ||14.00 - 15.30|
|Location: ||Kolade Teaching Room|
We conduct a natural field experiment on conflict in swimming pools. When all lanes are occupied, one of our confederates joins a randomly selected lane and asks one of the swimmers to move to another lane. The lane represents a contested club good. We vary the confederates’ valuation (high and low) for the good through the message they deliver. Also, we take advantage of the natural variation in the number of swimmers and their speed to proxy for the swimmers’ valuation of the good. Consistent with conflict theory predictions swimmers react strategically: (1) the higher the confederate’s valuation, the more likely the swimmer is to leave the lane; (2) the higher the swimmer’s own valuation, the less likely they are to leave; (3) the higher the opportunity cost of moving, the less likely the swimmer is to leave.