BID Seminar: Group Identity and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games
|Speaker:||Tracy Liu, Tsinghua University|
|Date: ||Thursday 8 December 2016|
|Location: ||Bateman Lecture Theatre, Building One|
We design a laboratory experiment to study the impact of group identity on individual cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games, and how this impact interacts with the discount factor in the games. We find that under both the low and high discount factors, participants are more likely to cooperate when they are paired with an ingroup member, compared to when they are paired with an outgroup member or when there are no groups. However, the high cooperation level with an ingroup member decreases over time with the low discount factor, while it sustains over time with the high discount factor. We also find that when being paired with an ingroup member participants are less likely to adopt always-defect as their repeated game strategy. This effect is stronger in the games with the high discount factor.