Contagion of self-interested behavior: evidence from group dictator game experiments
Tax Administration Research Centre (TARC)
|Speaker:||Toru Takemoto, Tezukayama University|
|Date:||Thursday 14 May 2015|
|Location:||Matrix Lecture Theatre, Building One|
We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity.
We make two findings on group decision-making. First, we show that group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, we find that a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making