Microeconomic Theory II
This is the second module in microeconomic theory. You will study rational strategic decision making, i.e. game theory in static and dynamic contexts, both with and without complete information, and repeated games. After developing the tools to theoretically analyse strategic behaviours, you will study the design of incentive structures in strategic settings: i.e. principal-agent problems, auctions, mechanism design and market design.
Full module specification
|Module title:||Microeconomic Theory II|
|Duration of module:||
Duration (weeks) - term 2: |
The aim of the module is to develop formal reasoning abilities and apply tools of strategic thinking and strategic problem solving widely used by economists and other social scientists. After completing this course, you will be able to reason formally and model strategic decision makers in a variety of economic contexts.
ILO: Module-specific skills
- 1. develop formal mathematical reasoning abilities.
- 2. formally model strategic interactions.
- 3. formally describe suitable equilibrium outcomes of the strategic interactions.
- 4. analytically solve models of games.
ILO: Discipline-specific skills
- 5. critically evaluate frontier research in game theory and its applications.
- 6. develop formal modelling abilities of core economic phenomena.
- 7. theoretically build and solve formal models of economic phenomena requiring strategic reasoning.
ILO: Personal and key skills
- 8. develop formal reasoning abilities and engage in abstract thinking.
- 9. recognise and model strategic interactions.
Learning activities and teaching methods (given in hours of study time)
|Scheduled Learning and Teaching Activities||Guided independent study||Placement / study abroad|
Details of learning activities and teaching methods
|Category||Hours of study time||Description|
|Scheduled Learning and Teaching||22||Lecturers (2 hours per week)|
|Scheduled Learning and Teaching||10||Tutorials (1 hour per week)|
|Guided Independent Study||118||Reading, research, preparation for tutorials, lectures and assignments|
|Form of assessment||Size of the assessment (eg length / duration)||ILOs assessed||Feedback method|
|Assignments (2 over the course of the term)||10 questions per assignment||1-9||Oral, and written (ELE)|
Summative assessment (% of credit)
|Coursework||Written exams||Practical exams|
Details of summative assessment
|Form of assessment||% of credit||Size of the assessment (eg length / duration)||ILOs assessed||Feedback method|
|Midterm Exam||25||1 hour||1-9||Oral and written feedback(ELE)|
|Assignment 1||25||2000 words||1-9||Oral and written feedback(ELE)|
|Assignment 2||25||2000 words||1-9||Oral and written feedback(ELE)|
Details of re-assessment (where required by referral or deferral)
|Original form of assessment||Form of re-assessment||ILOs re-assessed||Timescale for re-assessment|
|Mid Term||Exam (1 hour) 25%||1-9||August/September Reassessment Period|
|Assignment 1||Assignment (2000 words)||1-9||July|
|Assignment 2||Assignment (2000 words)||1-9||July|
|Examination||Examination (1 hour) 25%||1-9||August/September Reassessment Period|
Decision Making under Risk
Static game theory with complete information
- Imperfect Competition
Static Game Theory with Incomplete Information
Dynamic Game Theory with complete information
Dynamic Game Theory with incomplete information
Indicative learning resources - Basic reading
Microeconomic Theory, Mas-Colell, A , Whinston, M.D and Green, OUP USA, 1995.
Game Theory, Fudenberg and Tirole, ANE Books, 2009.
Advanced Microeconomic Theory (Third Edition), Jehle and Reny, Pearson, 2011
A Course in Game Theory, Osborne and Rubinstein, MIT Press, 1994
Contract Theory, Bolton and Dewatripont, MIT Press, 2005
Module has an active ELE page?
Last revision date