Stephen joined UEBS in 2020 after completing a three-year position as a postdoctoral prize research fellow at Nuffield College/University of Oxford. He received his PhD from Stanford University in 2017.
Stephen’s research focuses on the application of network science to economics with a particular emphasis on applied microeconomic theory. He is also interested in other areas of applied micro theory such as matching and in behavioral and experimental economics.
Qualifications
- PhD (Stanford University)
Links
Research interests
- Applied Microeconomic Theory
- Networks
- Behavioral and experimental
Stephen’s main research interest is social and economic networks, particularly as a means for modelling social learning. He is also interested into the insights of behavioral economics for learning and into the use of experimental and empirical methods to refine theories and motivate modelling.
Research projects
Stephen is currently working on a theoretical model of how individuals choose from whom to learn in the presence of real-world frictions to the communication of information. To test the validity of this theory, he is working on a collaboration to analyze network data from a field experiment in Nepal. In addition, he is developing a lab experiment to test for how well individuals anticipate the economic choices of others when evaluating the claims they make.
Key publications | Publications by category | Publications by year
Publications by category
Journal articles
Jackson MO, Nei S (In Press). Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade.
SSRN Electronic Journal DOI.
Nei S, Pakzad-Hurson B (2021). Strategic disaggregation in matching markets.
Journal of Economic Theory Full text.
DOI.
Jackson MO, Nei S (2015). Networks of military alliances, wars, and international trade.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
112(50), 15277-15284.
Abstract:
Networks of military alliances, wars, and international trade
We investigate the role of networks of alliances in preventing (multilateral) interstate wars. We first show that, in the absence of international trade, no network of alliances is peaceful and stable. We then show that international trade induces peaceful and stable networks: Trade increases the density of alliances so that countries are less vulnerable to attack and also reduces countries’ incentives to attack an ally. We present historical data on wars and trade showing that the dramatic drop in interstate wars since 1950 is paralleled by a densification and stabilization of trading relationships and alliances. Based on the model we also examine some specific relationships, finding that countries with high levels of trade with their allies are less likely to be involved in wars with any other countries (including allies and nonallies), and that an increase in trade between two countries correlates with a lower chance that they will go to war with each other.
Abstract.
DOI.
Publications by year
In Press
Jackson MO, Nei S (In Press). Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade.
SSRN Electronic Journal DOI.
2021
Nei S, Pakzad-Hurson B (2021). Strategic disaggregation in matching markets.
Journal of Economic Theory Full text.
DOI.
2015
Jackson MO, Nei S (2015). Networks of military alliances, wars, and international trade.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
112(50), 15277-15284.
Abstract:
Networks of military alliances, wars, and international trade
We investigate the role of networks of alliances in preventing (multilateral) interstate wars. We first show that, in the absence of international trade, no network of alliances is peaceful and stable. We then show that international trade induces peaceful and stable networks: Trade increases the density of alliances so that countries are less vulnerable to attack and also reduces countries’ incentives to attack an ally. We present historical data on wars and trade showing that the dramatic drop in interstate wars since 1950 is paralleled by a densification and stabilization of trading relationships and alliances. Based on the model we also examine some specific relationships, finding that countries with high levels of trade with their allies are less likely to be involved in wars with any other countries (including allies and nonallies), and that an increase in trade between two countries correlates with a lower chance that they will go to war with each other.
Abstract.
DOI.
