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Professor Shmuel Zamir

Professor Shmuel Zamir

Professor of Economics

5961

1.22
Streatham Court, University of Exeter, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4PU, UK

Shmuel Zamir joined the University of Exeter Business School as a Professor of Economics in May 2013. Originally from Baghdad, Shmuel did his undergraduate and masters degrees in mathematics and physics at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. After military service, he completed his PhD in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information under the supervision of Robert Aumann (Nobel Laureate, Economics 2005). Starting his academic career in UCLA and then CORE (Belgium), he returned to the Hebrew University as a lecturer in statistics, and has been there until his move to Exeter in 2013.

He was a founding member of the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University—one of the pre-eminent research centres in the world, focussing on the exploration of the rational basis of decision-making, using multiple disciplines, including mathematics, economics, psychology, biology, education, computer science, philosophy, business, statistics, and law.

Shmuel’s research interests are broad, but are united by an interest in the implications of incomplete information for decision-making, both individually and strategically. His interview to join Exeter was the first job interview that he has ever done.

Shmuel is the author of Game Theory (with M. Maschler and E. Solan). Cambridge University Press 2013.

Nationality: Israeli/French

Administrative responsibilities

  • Director of the Centre for the Study of Risk and Ambiguity

Research

Research interests

  • Game theory and applications: Incomplete Information, Common Knowledge, Repeated games, Strategic use of information.
  • Economic theory and applications: Auctions and bidding, Bargaining, Principal-Agent problems, Inspection.
  • Experimental interactive decision theory: Mixed strategy equilibria, Bargaining, Coalition formation, Political economy, Team games, Value of information.

Research projects

  • Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a General Dependent Jury (with Bezalel Peleg)
  • Strategic aspects of seller information in auctions (with Todd Kaplan).
  • Coalition Formations (with Bezalel Peleg)
  • Multiple Equilibria in First-Price Auctions (with Todd Kaplan)
  • Experimental Design and Data Analysis for Experimental Economics and Game Theory (with Yossi Rinot and Irit Novik)
  • Experimental paradigm for `observing' mixed strategies (with Rosemarie Nagel).
  • A Model of Bargaining with Incomplete Information (with Edi Karni).
  • Editing: Handbook of Game Theory Volume IV (with Peyton Young)

Key publications | Publications by category | Publications by year

Publications by category


Books

Mertens JF, Sorin S, Zamir S (2015). Repeated games. Abstract.
Young P, Zamir S (2014). Handbook of Game Theory., Elsevier. Abstract.
Zamir S (1992). Chapter 5 Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum.

Journal articles

Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2015). Advances in Auctions. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 4(1), 381-453. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2015). Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions. Economic Theory Bulletin, 3(1), 65-77.
Peleg B, Zamir S (2014). Representation of constitutions under incomplete information. Economic Theory Abstract.
Peleg B, Zamir S (2014). Representation of constitutions under incomplete information. Economic Theory, 57(2), 279-302. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2012). Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: Analytic solutions to the general case. Economic Theory, 50(2), 269-302. Abstract.  Full text.
Peleg B, Zamir S (2012). Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury. Social Choice and Welfare, 39(1), 91-125. Abstract.
Nowik I, Zamir S, Segev I (2012). Losing the battle but winning the war: Game theoretic analysis of the competition between motoneurons innervating a skeletal muscle. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience(MARCH 2012), 1-7. Abstract.
von Stengel B, Zamir S (2010). Leadership games with convex strategy sets. Games and Economic Behavior, 69(2), 446-457. Abstract.
Barberà S, Zamir S (2010). Memorial. International Journal of Game Theory, 39(1), 1-2.
Zamir S (2009). International Journal of Game Theory: Letter from the editor. International Journal of Game Theory, 38(1), 1-2.
Lambert-Mogiliansky A, Zamir S, Zwirn H (2006). Type Indeterminacy: a Model for the KT(Kahneman-Tversky)-Man.  Abstract.  Author URL.

Chapters

Zamir S (2009). Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information. In Meyers RA (Ed) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science.  Abstract.

Publications by year


2015

Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2015). Advances in Auctions. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 4(1), 381-453. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2015). Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions. Economic Theory Bulletin, 3(1), 65-77.
Mertens JF, Sorin S, Zamir S (2015). Repeated games. Abstract.

2014

Young P, Zamir S (2014). Handbook of Game Theory., Elsevier. Abstract.
Peleg B, Zamir S (2014). Representation of constitutions under incomplete information. Economic Theory Abstract.
Peleg B, Zamir S (2014). Representation of constitutions under incomplete information. Economic Theory, 57(2), 279-302. Abstract.

2012

Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2012). Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: Analytic solutions to the general case. Economic Theory, 50(2), 269-302. Abstract.  Full text.
Peleg B, Zamir S (2012). Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury. Social Choice and Welfare, 39(1), 91-125. Abstract.
Nowik I, Zamir S, Segev I (2012). Losing the battle but winning the war: Game theoretic analysis of the competition between motoneurons innervating a skeletal muscle. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience(MARCH 2012), 1-7. Abstract.

2010

von Stengel B, Zamir S (2010). Leadership games with convex strategy sets. Games and Economic Behavior, 69(2), 446-457. Abstract.
Barberà S, Zamir S (2010). Memorial. International Journal of Game Theory, 39(1), 1-2.

2009

Zamir S (2009). Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information. In Meyers RA (Ed) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science.  Abstract.
Zamir S (2009). International Journal of Game Theory: Letter from the editor. International Journal of Game Theory, 38(1), 1-2.

2006

Lambert-Mogiliansky A, Zamir S, Zwirn H (2006). Type Indeterminacy: a Model for the KT(Kahneman-Tversky)-Man.  Abstract.  Author URL.

1992

Zamir S (1992). Chapter 5 Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum.

Awards and Honours


External positions

Teaching interests

  • All topics in Microeconomics
  • All topics in Game Theory

Modules

2016/17