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Professor Todd R Kaplan

Professor Todd R Kaplan

Professor of Economics

3237

+44 (0) 1392 723237

1.29
Streatham Court, University of Exeter, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4PU, UK

Professor Todd Kaplan has been a faculty member since 2000. Before that, he was a lecturer at Ben-Gurion University. He has received grants from the Nuffield Foundation, British Academy, ESRC, Leverhulme Foundation and the Israeli Science Foundation. He was a co-winner for the Economics Network 2009 e-learning award for developing teaching resources in a grant from HEFCE. His current duties include being the co-director of FEELE laboratory for experimental economics.

Nationality: USA / Israel

Administrative responsibilities

  • Co-Director, The FEELE laboratory

Qualifications

BS (Caltech), MA (Minnesota), PhD (Minnesota)

Links

Research clusters

Research interests

  • Economic theory
  • Industrial organisation
  • Experimental economics

Professor Kaplan has diverse research interests that span theoretical, computational and experimental economics. His theoretical work includes research on price competition, cost sharing and patent races.

In price competition, he re-examines the classic Bertrand competition model (Spanish Economic Review) and shows that the standard textbook example is wrong since it overlooks other equilibria. Another paper shows that seemingly competitive policies, such as agreeing to match a competitor's price, are in fact very anticompetitive (International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000).

When a group shares a common production function, they must decide how to divide the costs. For instance, if two friends want to share a pizza, how do they divide the costs. This is not so easy since they must also decide what size of pizza to order and a poor rule may cause them to overspend or underspend. Todd has two publications on this topic, one in International Economic Review and the other in Journal of Mathematical Economics.

He has modelled patent races as a contest, where on the first to invent wins but all still have to pay for their research. In his model, the value of the patent varies with the expense since an earlier innovation date is worth more to the winner. He has written three papers investigating this design in the Journal of Industrial Economics (2002), International Journal of Industrial Organization (2003) and in RAND (2008).

Todd has made earlier contributions to the computational field. He has published a paper in the Mathematica Journal and two chapters in a best-selling book edited by Hal Varian. Probably his best known work is what is known as the 'Kaplan' strategy. This was a simple computer strategy that was written to compete in a double auction, a well studied environment in experimental economics which is a simplified environment of a stock exchange. It won a well advertised tournament sponsored by the Santa Fe Institute. Recently, with the introduction of computerised agents acting on the internet, this research has had a resurgence of interest.

Research projects

Professor Kaplan currently has a research grant from the Nuffield Foundation for studying bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions. He is the supervisor of Pricilla Marimo, who is studying the communication of climate change risk.

Key publications | Publications by category | Publications by year

Key publications


Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2012). Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: Analytic solutions to the general case. Economic Theory, 50(2), 269-302. Abstract.  Full text.
Kaplan TR, Ruffle BJ (2012). Which Way to Cooperate. Economic Journal, 122(563), 1042-1068. Abstract.  Full text.
Kaplan TR, Ruffle BJ (2009). In Search of Welfare-Improving Gifts. European Economic Review, 53(4), 445-460. Full text.
Cohen C, Kaplan TR, Sela A (2008). Optimal rewards in contests. RAND Journal of Economics, 39(2), 434-451. Abstract.  Full text.

Publications by category


Journal articles

Brams SJ, Kaplan TR, Kilgour DM (2015). A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices. Group Decision and Negotiation, 24(3), 401-413. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2015). Advances in Auctions. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 4(1), 381-453. Abstract.
Marimo P, Kaplan TR, Mylne K, Sharpe M (2015). Communication of uncertainty in temperature forecasts. Weather and Forecasting, 30(1), 5-22. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2015). Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions. Economic Theory Bulletin, 3(1), 65-77.
Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (2015). The optimal design of rewards in contests. Review of Economic Design Abstract.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Kaplan TR (2014). An Experiment on the Causes of Bank Run Contagions. European Economic Review, 72, 39-51. Full text.
Navon D, Kaplan TR, Kasten R (2013). Egocentric framing--One way people may fail in a switch dilemma: Evidence from excessive lane switching. Acta psychologica, 144, 604-616. Full text.
Chakravarty S, Kaplan T (2013). Optimal allocation without transfer payments. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1), 1-20. Abstract.  Full text.
Gould ED, Kaplan TR (2013). The peer effect of Jose Canseco: a reply to J. C. Bradbury. Econ Journal Watch, 10(1), 70-86. Abstract.
Balkenborg D, Kaplan T, Miller T (2012). A simple economic teaching experiment on the hold-up problem. Journal of Economic Education, 43(4), 377-385. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2012). Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: Analytic solutions to the general case. Economic Theory, 50(2), 269-302. Abstract.  Full text.
Kaplan TR (2012). Communication of preferences in contests for contracts. Economic Theory, 51(2), 487-503. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Ruffle BJ (2012). Which Way to Cooperate. Economic Journal, 122(563), 1042-1068. Abstract.  Full text.
Balkenborg DG, Kaplan TR, Ishizaka A (2011). Does AHP help us make a choice?-An experimental evaluation. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 62(10), 1801-1812.
Ishizaka A, Balkenborg D, Kaplan T (2011). Influence of aggregation and measurement scale on ranking a compromise alternative in AHP. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 62(4), 700-710. Abstract.
Gould ED, Kaplan TR (2011). Learning unethical practices from a co-worker: the peer effect of Jose Canseco. Labour Economics, 18(3), 338-348. Abstract.  Full text.
Balkenborg D, Kaplan T, Miller T (2011). Teaching Bank Runs with Classroom Experiments. The Journal of Economic Education, 42(3), 224-242. Abstract.  Full text.
Kilgour DM, Brams SJ, Kaplan TR (2011). Three procedures for inducing honesty in bargaining. ACM International Conference Proceeding Series, 170-176. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Sela A (2010). Effective contests. Economics Letters, 106(1), 38-41. Abstract.
Balkenborg D, Kaplan T (2010). Using Economic Classroom Experiments. International Review of Economics Education, 9(2), 99-106. Abstract.  Full text.
Chakravarty S, Kaplan TR (2010). Vote or Shout. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 10(1). Abstract.  Full text.
Chakravarty S, Kaplan T (2010). Vote or shout. Berkeley Press Journal of Theoretical Economics, Contributions
Roulston M, Kaplan TR (2009). A laboratory-based study of understanding of uncertainty in 5-day site-specific temperature forecasts. Meteorological Applications, 16(2), 237-244.
Kaplan TR, Ruffle BJ (2009). In Search of Welfare-Improving Gifts. European Economic Review, 53(4), 445-460. Full text.
Cohen C, Kaplan TR, Sela A (2008). Optimal rewards in contests. RAND Journal of Economics, 39(2), 434-451. Abstract.  Full text.
Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (2006). Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment. American Economic Review, 96(4), 1351-1354. Full text.
Kaplan TR (2006). Why Banks Should Keep Secrets. Economic Theory, 27(2), 341-357. Full text.
Brams SJ, Kaplan TR (2004). Dividing the indivisible - Procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16(2), 143-173. Abstract.  Full text.
Kaplan TR, Ruffle BJ (2004). The self-serving bias and beliefs about rationality. Economic Inquiry, 42(2), 237-246. Abstract.  Full text.
Kaplan TR, Luski I, Wettstein D (2003). Government Policy towards Multi-National Corporations. Economics Bulletin, 6(3), 1-8. Full text.
Kaplan TR, Luski I, Wettstein D (2003). Innovative activity and sunk cost. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(8), 1111-1133. Abstract.  Full text.
Kaplan TR, Luski I, Sela A, Wettenstein D (2002). All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards. Journal of Industrial Economics, 50(4), 417-430. Full text.
Kaplan TR (2000). Effective price-matching: a comment. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(8), 1291-1294. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (2000). Surplus Sharing with a Two-Stage Mechanism. International Economic Review, 41(2), 339-409.
Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (2000). The Possibility of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria with Constant-Returns-to-Scale Technology under Bertrand Competition. Spanish Economic Review, 2(1), 65-71.
Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (1999). Cost Sharing: Efficiency and Implementation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 32(4), 489-502.
Kaplan TR, Ruffle B (1998). Self-Serving Bias [Comment]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(2), 243-244.
Kaplan TR, Dickhaut J (1992). A Program for Finding Nash Equilibria. The Mathematica Journal, 1(4), 87-93.

Chapters

Kaplan TR, Dickhaut J (1993). A Program for Finding Nash Equilibria. In Varian HR (Ed) Economic and Financial Modeling with Mathematica, Springer.
Kaplan TR, Mukherji A (1993). Designing an Incentive-Compatible Contract. In Varian HR (Ed) Economic and Financial Modeling with Mathematica, Springer-Verlag. Abstract.

Publications by year


2015

Brams SJ, Kaplan TR, Kilgour DM (2015). A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices. Group Decision and Negotiation, 24(3), 401-413. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2015). Advances in Auctions. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 4(1), 381-453. Abstract.
Marimo P, Kaplan TR, Mylne K, Sharpe M (2015). Communication of uncertainty in temperature forecasts. Weather and Forecasting, 30(1), 5-22. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2015). Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions. Economic Theory Bulletin, 3(1), 65-77.
Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (2015). The optimal design of rewards in contests. Review of Economic Design Abstract.

2014

Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Kaplan TR (2014). An Experiment on the Causes of Bank Run Contagions. European Economic Review, 72, 39-51. Full text.
Fischer S, Güth W, Kaplan TR, Zultan R (2014). Auctions and Leaks: a Theoretical and Experimental Investigation.  Abstract.

2013

Navon D, Kaplan TR, Kasten R (2013). Egocentric framing--One way people may fail in a switch dilemma: Evidence from excessive lane switching. Acta psychologica, 144, 604-616. Full text.
Chakravarty S, Kaplan T (2013). Optimal allocation without transfer payments. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1), 1-20. Abstract.  Full text.
Gould ED, Kaplan TR (2013). The peer effect of Jose Canseco: a reply to J. C. Bradbury. Econ Journal Watch, 10(1), 70-86. Abstract.

2012

Balkenborg D, Kaplan T, Miller T (2012). A simple economic teaching experiment on the hold-up problem. Journal of Economic Education, 43(4), 377-385. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Zamir S (2012). Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: Analytic solutions to the general case. Economic Theory, 50(2), 269-302. Abstract.  Full text.
Kaplan TR (2012). Communication of preferences in contests for contracts. Economic Theory, 51(2), 487-503. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Ruffle BJ (2012). Which Way to Cooperate. Economic Journal, 122(563), 1042-1068. Abstract.  Full text.

2011

Balkenborg DG, Kaplan TR, Ishizaka A (2011). Does AHP help us make a choice?-An experimental evaluation. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 62(10), 1801-1812.
Ishizaka A, Balkenborg D, Kaplan T (2011). Influence of aggregation and measurement scale on ranking a compromise alternative in AHP. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 62(4), 700-710. Abstract.
Gould ED, Kaplan TR (2011). Learning unethical practices from a co-worker: the peer effect of Jose Canseco. Labour Economics, 18(3), 338-348. Abstract.  Full text.
Balkenborg D, Kaplan T, Miller T (2011). Teaching Bank Runs with Classroom Experiments. The Journal of Economic Education, 42(3), 224-242. Abstract.  Full text.
Kilgour DM, Brams SJ, Kaplan TR (2011). Three procedures for inducing honesty in bargaining. ACM International Conference Proceeding Series, 170-176. Abstract.

2010

Kaplan TR, Sela A (2010). Effective contests. Economics Letters, 106(1), 38-41. Abstract.
Balkenborg D, Kaplan T (2010). Using Economic Classroom Experiments. International Review of Economics Education, 9(2), 99-106. Abstract.  Full text.
Chakravarty S, Kaplan TR (2010). Vote or Shout. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 10(1). Abstract.  Full text.
Chakravarty S, Kaplan T (2010). Vote or shout. Berkeley Press Journal of Theoretical Economics, Contributions

2009

Roulston M, Kaplan TR (2009). A laboratory-based study of understanding of uncertainty in 5-day site-specific temperature forecasts. Meteorological Applications, 16(2), 237-244.
Kaplan TR, Ruffle BJ (2009). In Search of Welfare-Improving Gifts. European Economic Review, 53(4), 445-460. Full text.

2008

Cohen C, Kaplan TR, Sela A (2008). Optimal rewards in contests. RAND Journal of Economics, 39(2), 434-451. Abstract.  Full text.

2006

Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (2006). Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment. American Economic Review, 96(4), 1351-1354. Full text.
Kaplan TR (2006). Why Banks Should Keep Secrets. Economic Theory, 27(2), 341-357. Full text.

2004

Brams SJ, Kaplan TR (2004). Dividing the indivisible - Procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16(2), 143-173. Abstract.  Full text.
Kaplan TR, Ruffle BJ (2004). The self-serving bias and beliefs about rationality. Economic Inquiry, 42(2), 237-246. Abstract.  Full text.

2003

Kaplan TR, Luski I, Wettstein D (2003). Government Policy towards Multi-National Corporations. Economics Bulletin, 6(3), 1-8. Full text.
Kaplan TR, Luski I, Wettstein D (2003). Innovative activity and sunk cost. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(8), 1111-1133. Abstract.  Full text.

2002

Kaplan TR, Luski I, Sela A, Wettenstein D (2002). All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards. Journal of Industrial Economics, 50(4), 417-430. Full text.

2000

Kaplan TR (2000). Effective price-matching: a comment. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(8), 1291-1294. Abstract.
Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (2000). Surplus Sharing with a Two-Stage Mechanism. International Economic Review, 41(2), 339-409.
Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (2000). The Possibility of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria with Constant-Returns-to-Scale Technology under Bertrand Competition. Spanish Economic Review, 2(1), 65-71.

1999

Kaplan TR, Wettstein D (1999). Cost Sharing: Efficiency and Implementation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 32(4), 489-502.

1998

Kaplan TR, Ruffle B (1998). Self-Serving Bias [Comment]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(2), 243-244.

1993

Kaplan TR, Dickhaut J (1993). A Program for Finding Nash Equilibria. In Varian HR (Ed) Economic and Financial Modeling with Mathematica, Springer.
Kaplan TR, Mukherji A (1993). Designing an Incentive-Compatible Contract. In Varian HR (Ed) Economic and Financial Modeling with Mathematica, Springer-Verlag. Abstract.

1992

Kaplan TR, Dickhaut J (1992). A Program for Finding Nash Equilibria. The Mathematica Journal, 1(4), 87-93.

Awards and Honours

  • 1990: Winner of the Santa Fe Institute's Double Auction Tournament
  • 1996: Kreitman Fellowship (Israel)
  • 2002: Zif Fellowship (Germany)
  • 2006: Leverhulme Fellowship (UK)
  • 2009: Co-winner of the Economics Network e-learning award

Conferences and invited presentations

Professor Kaplan's teaching interests include microeconomics, industrial economics and game theory. He is especially interested in using classroom experiments to teach economic concepts and has recently developed an experiment to demonstrate bank runs in the classroom.

Modules

2016/17