Publications by year
In Press
Chakravarty S, Makris M (In Press). Experts and Incentives for Credence Good Providers.
Abstract:
Experts and Incentives for Credence Good Providers.
The quality of credence goods is difficult to evaluate and hence their buyers may find it difficult to provide incentives to credence good producers/sellers. Indeed, to do so they may need to employ experts in evaluating the various attributes of the credence good. We investigate the optimal contract that a buyer offers in a take-or-leave-it manner to the provider of a credence good, and in particular how the experts' evaluations are optimally utilized in such a contract.
Abstract.
Chakravarty S (In Press). Pre-play promises, threats and commitments under partial credibility. Economic Inquiry
In Prep
Chakravarty S, Fonseca M (In Prep). Public good provision and social identity.
In Press
Chakravarty S, Kelsey D, Teitelbaum J (In Press). Reverse Bayesianism and Act Independence. Journal of Economic Theory
Chakravarty S, Choo L, Fonseca M, Kaplan T (In Press). Should regulators always be transparent? a bank run experiment. European Economic Review
In Prep
Chakravarty S, Kelsey D (In Prep). Tort Rules: with Optimistic and Pessimistic Players.
Abstract:
Tort Rules: with Optimistic and Pessimistic Players
This paper analyzes liability rules, when agents, both the potential injurer and the potential victim can perceive ambiguity, i.e. not aware of the probability of the accident. Both the potential injurer and the potential victim invests in care and they derive utility from the activity which may lead to the accident. We find that negligence and strict liability are not efficient if the stipulated care level is the optimal care level. But under negligence with the defence of contributory negligence, if the agents are pessimistic, we may be able to get efficient care level by both agents.
Abstract.
In Press
Chakravarty S, Kaplan TR, Myles G (In Press). When Costly Voting is Beneficial. Journal of Public Economics
2020
Chakravarty S, Kelsey D, Teitelbaum JC (2020). Operationalizing Reverse Bayesiansim.
DOI.
2019
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Ghosh S, Kumar P, Marjit S (2019). Religious fragmentation, social identity and other-regarding preferences: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India.
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics,
82Abstract:
Religious fragmentation, social identity and other-regarding preferences: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India
We examine the impact of religious identity and village-level religious fragmentation on other-regarding preferences. We report on a series of two-player binary Dictator experiments conducted on a sample of 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural West Bengal, India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of religious fragmentation in the village where subjects reside. Both Muslims’ and Hindus’ aversion to advantageous inequality declines as the probability of facing an out-group member increases. We find no evidence of aversion to disadvantageous inequality on either religious sample. Both Muslim and Hindu participants display aversion to advantageous inequality in both fragmented villages and homogeneous villages. The effect of village fragmentation on aversion to disadvantageous inequality differs across religious groups.
Abstract.
DOI.
2018
Chakravarty S, Kelsey D, Teitelbaum JC (2018). Tort Liability and Unawareness.
DOI.
2016
Chakravarty S, Kelsey D (2016). Ambiguity and Accident Law. Journal of Public Economic Theory
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Ghosh S, Marjit S (2016). Religious Fragmentation, Social Identity and Conflict: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment in India.
PLOS ONE,
11(10), e0164708-e0164708.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Ghosh S, Marjit S (2016). Religious fragmentation, social identity and cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India.
European Economic Review,
90, 265-279.
Abstract:
Religious fragmentation, social identity and cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India
We study the role of village-level religious fragmentation on intra- and inter-group cooperation in India. We report on data on two-player prisoners׳ dilemma and stag hunt experiments played by 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of village-level religious heterogeneity. In religiously heterogeneous villages, cooperation rates in the prisoners׳ dilemma, and to a lesser extent the stag hunt game, are higher when subjects of either religion play with a fellow in-group member than when they play with an out-group member or with someone whose identity is unknown. Interestingly, cooperation rates among people of the same religion are significantly lower in homogeneous villages than in fragmented villages in both games.
Abstract.
DOI.
2015
Fonseca MA, Chakravarty S (2015). Discrimination via Exclusion: an Experiment on Group Identity and Club Goods.
Journal of Public Economic Theory DOI.
Chakravarty S, Kelsey D (2015). Sharing ambiguous risks.
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
56, 1-8.
Abstract:
Sharing ambiguous risks
We analyse risk-sharing when individuals perceive ambiguity about future events. The main departure from previous work is that different individuals perceive ambiguity differently. We show that individuals fail to share risks for extreme events. This may provide an explanation why we do not observe individuals buying insurance for certain events like hurricanes or earthquakes and why many contracts contain an "act of God"clause, which allows non-performance if an unforeseen event occurs.
Abstract.
DOI.
2014
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA, Kaplan TR (2014). An Experiment on the Causes of Bank Run Contagions.
European Economic Review,
72, 39-51.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Kelsey D (2014). Sharing Ambiguous Risks.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Fonseca MA (2014). The Effect of Social Fragmentation on Public Good Provision: an Experimental Study. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 53, 1-9.
2013
Chakravarty S, Kaplan T (2013). Optimal allocation without transfer payments.
Games and Economic Behavior,
77(1), 1-20.
Abstract:
Optimal allocation without transfer payments
Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in
return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have
private information in regards to their values or needs. In this paper, we find an optimal
mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent. While the designer cannot
charge agents, he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them. We find conditions
for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share (or using
lotteries if the goods are indivisible) is optimal. In other cases, those that send the highest
signal should receive the goods; however, we then show that there exist cases where
more complicated mechanisms are superior. Also, we show that the optimal mechanism
is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated.
Abstract.
2012
Chakravarty S, Makris M (2012). Designing Incentives under Multidimensional Performance Measures.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
111(2), 122-124.
Abstract:
Designing Incentives under Multidimensional Performance Measures
We attempt to shed some light on the problem of providing incentives to service
providers such as teachers and doctors. Often, outcomes of such services are not
verifiable, and this has been cited as a reason for lack of incentive provision. We
derive the contract offered by a principal if, in addition tomoral hazard, the output
of the agent may not be verified. We show that verified high attainment may not
be rewarded. In this case, the bonus is increasing in the ability to verify output.
We also show that an increase in potential nonverifiability may lead to efficiency
gains and be beneficial for the principal. (JEL: D8, J3)
Abstract.
Makris M, Chakravarty S (2012). Designing Incentives under Multidimensional Performance Measures.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE,
168(4).
DOI.
2011
Chakravarty S, Ghosh S (2011). An experimental investigation of entry cost effects in sealed-bid dollar auctions.
Economics Letters,
111(2), 122-124.
Author URL.
2010
Chakravarty S, Kaplan TR, Myles GD (2010). The Benefits of Costly Voting.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Kaplan TR, Myles G (2010). The Benefits of Costly Voting.
Abstract:
The Benefits of Costly Voting
We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome will be determined by voters with higher valuations. We show that in such a case welfare may be enhanced. Such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and a high enough expected value.
Abstract.
Chakravarty S, Kaplan TR (2010). Vote or Shout.
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
10(1).
Abstract:
Vote or Shout
We examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding: majority voting and shouting, that is, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. In for other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values.
Abstract.
DOI.
2009
Chakravarty S, MacLeod WB (2009). Contracting in the shadow of the law.
The RAND Journal of Economics,
40(3), 533-557.
DOI.
2008
Chakravarty S, Kaplan TR (2008). Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments.
Makris M, Chakravarty S (2008). Resolving Contractual Disputes.
Chakravarty S, Makris M (2008). To Reward Success or Not to Reward?.
2006
Chakravarty S, MacLeod WB (2006). Construction Contracts (or: How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?).
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Kaplan TR (2006). Manna from Heaven or Forty Years in the Desert: Optimal Allocation Without Transfer Payments.
DOI.
Chakravarty S, Makris M (2006). Resolving Contractual Disputes Miltos Makris).
2005
MacLeod, B. (2005). On the Efficiency and the Enforcement of Standard Form Contracts: Case of Construction. Rand Journal of Economics
2004
Chakravarty S, MacLeod WB (2004). On the Efficiency of Standard Form Contracts: the Case of Construction.
DOI.