Dr. Simone Meraglia joined the University of Exeter Business School in 2014 as a Lecturer in Economics after a year spent as Post-Doctoral research fellow at the University of Bologna, and as a visiting scholar at the New York University. He finished his Ph.D. in Economics at the Toulouse School of Economics in 2013.
Nationality: Italian
Personal Webpage
Qualifications
- Ph. D (Toulouse School of Economics)
Research clusters
Research interests
- Political Economy
- Organisational Economics
- Economic History
My main research interest lies in the analysis of political and market (supporting) institutions, their determinants, and how they interrelate one with another. I explore theoretical and applied models of institution building and State formation, with a focus on the causes and consequences of weak and strong States.
Research projects
I am currently working on the link between the rise of the market economy and the joint evolution of local and state-wide institutions, with an applications to Medieval and Modern Europe.
Key publications | Publications by category | Publications by year
Publications by category
Journal articles
Angelucci C, Meraglia S, Voigtländer N (2022). How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments: from the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act.
American Economic Review,
112(10), 3441-3487.
DOI.
Marattin L, Meraglia S, Minetti R (2022). Sovereign bail‐outs and fiscal rules in a banking union.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
124(4), 1024-1055.
DOI.
Cobo-Reyes R, Katz Wisel G, Markussen T, Meraglia S (2022). Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence.
Social Choice and Welfare,
58, 619-677.
DOI.
Charness G, Cobo-Reyes R, Meraglia S, Sánchez Á (2020). Anticipated Discrimination, Choices, and Performance: Experimental Evidence.
European Economic Review,
127, 103473-103473.
DOI.
Cobo-Reyes R, Katz Wisel G, Meraglia S (2019). Endogenous Sanctioning Institutions and Migration Patterns: Experimental Evidence.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
158, 575-606.
DOI.
Publications by year
2022
Angelucci C, Meraglia S, Voigtländer N (2022). How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments: from the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act.
American Economic Review,
112(10), 3441-3487.
DOI.
Marattin L, Meraglia S, Minetti R (2022). Sovereign bail‐outs and fiscal rules in a banking union.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
124(4), 1024-1055.
DOI.
Cobo-Reyes R, Katz Wisel G, Markussen T, Meraglia S (2022). Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence.
Social Choice and Welfare,
58, 619-677.
DOI.
2020
Charness G, Cobo-Reyes R, Meraglia S, Sánchez Á (2020). Anticipated Discrimination, Choices, and Performance: Experimental Evidence.
European Economic Review,
127, 103473-103473.
DOI.
2019
Cobo-Reyes R, Katz Wisel G, Meraglia S (2019). Endogenous Sanctioning Institutions and Migration Patterns: Experimental Evidence.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
158, 575-606.
DOI.
Cobo-Reyes R, Katz G, Markussen T, Meraglia S (2019). Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence.
DOI.
2017
Meraglia S, Cobo R, Katz G (2017). Endogenous Sanctioning Institutions and Migration Patterns: Experimental Evidence.
2016
Marattin L, Meraglia S (2016). Potential Output and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union Under Asymmetric Information – 2nd Ed.
DOI.
2015
Marattin L, Meraglia S (2015). Potential Output and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union Under Asymmetric Information.
DOI.
Meraglia S, Angelucci C (2015). Trade, Law and Order, and Political Liberties: Theory and Application to English Medieval Boroughs.
Abstract:
Trade, Law and Order, and Political Liberties: Theory and Application to English Medieval Boroughs
We develop a framework that puts the administration at the core of the relationship between trade and political liberties. A ruler chooses the size of an administration that (i) collects taxes and (ii) provides law and order for a representative merchant to use. To be exploited, large gains from trade require a relatively large administration. However, keeping a large administration in check is difficult. When the resulting inefficiencies are significant, the ruler grants control of the administration to the better-informed merchant, even though this facilitates tax evasion. We analyze the case of post-Norman Conquest England (1066-1307) by using evidence on taxation, commerce, and political liberties across boroughs. We use boroughs’ ownership as a proxy for the cost of controlling the administration, and find that rulers with a high cost are more willing to grant boroughs the control of their administration. Also, provided it belongs to a high-cost ruler, a borough’s propensity to receive a grant increases with its commercial importance. Finally, we find that boroughs are willing to pay higher taxes in exchange for liberties.
Abstract.
