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Professor Michael Finus

Professor Michael Finus

Associate Professor of Economics of Climate Change

2574

0.48
Streatham Court, University of Exeter, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4PU, UK

Michael Finus is a Professor of Climate Change Economics at the Department of Economics at Exeter Business School. He has held previous appointments at the University of Stirling, UK and the University of Hagen, Germany. He works in the field of environmental economics and public goods, in particular on international environmental agreements. He has published widely in journals such as the Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Social Choice and Welfare, Public Choice, Environmental Resource Economics and Environment and Development Economics. He also published several books such as Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2001). He is a Member of the Editorial Board of Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, and regularly serves as a referee for journals like American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Games and Economic Behavior and Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. He also frequently serves on the scientific panel of the annual meetings of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. He is currently President-elect of the German Association of Environmental Economists and Visiting Fellow at the Smith Centre, University of Oxford. He is a Lead Author working for the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Research

Research interests

  • Game theory
  • Public economics
  • Environmental economics
  • Climate change

Professor Finus is interested in all kinds of economic problems that involve externalities (spillovers) across economic agents, where coordination and cooperation would generate global welfare gains but which typically suffer from 'free-riding' (in other words, not everyone contributes their fair share). He is analysing which factors cause free-riding and how and through which measures this can be mitigated. Many of these problems relate to collective decision making and public and global governance. International and global environmental problems, like climate change and overfishing, are prominent examples.

Research projects

Professor Finus's current research focuses specifically on:

Climate change

  • Uncertainty, learning, risk and hedging strategies
  • Endogenous technological change and issue linkage
  • Institutions and instruments for combating climate change
  • Primary versus ancillary benefits
  • Adaptation versus mitigation
  • Sequential evolvement of climate agreements

Theory of cooperation

  • Optimal transfers for establishing cooperation
  • Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibria

Topics on public goods

  • Regional fishery management organisations, migration and property rights
  • Strategic links between environmental and trade policies
  • Optimal protection strategies against piracy

 

Key publications | Publications by category | Publications by year

Key publications


Pintassilgo P, Finus M, Lindroos M, Munro G (2010). Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. Environmental and Resource Economics, 46, 377-402.
Finus M, Rundshagen B (2009). Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games. Social Choice and Welfare, 32(3), 389-406. Abstract.
Finus M, Maus S (2008). Modesty may pay!. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10(5), 801-826. Abstract.
Dellink R, Finus M, Olieman N (2008). The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement. Environmental & Resource Economics, 39(4), 357-377. Abstract.

Publications by category


Books

Böhringer C, Finus M, Vogt C (eds)(2002). Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice.  Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar.
Finus M (2001). Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation.  Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar.

Journal articles

Finus M, Rundshagen B, Eyckmans J (In Press). Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?. Annals of Operations Research
Pintassilgo P, Finus M, Lindroos M, Munro G (2010). Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. Environmental and Resource Economics, 46, 377-402.
Finus M, Saiz ME, EMT H (2009). An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements. Environment and Development Economics, 14, 117-137. Abstract.
Finus M, Rundshagen B (2009). Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games. Social Choice and Welfare, 32(3), 389-406. Abstract.
Altamirano-Cabrera JC, Finus M, Dellink R (2008). Do abatement quotas lead to more successful climate coalitions?. Manchester School, 76(1), 104-129. Abstract.
Finus M (2008). Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks and Future Challenges. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 29-67.
Finus M, Maus S (2008). Modesty may pay!. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10(5), 801-826. Abstract.
Finus M (2008). The Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or Promising Concepts?. Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 1, 13-25.
Dellink R, Finus M, Olieman N (2008). The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement. Environmental & Resource Economics, 39(4), 357-377. Abstract.
Eyckmans J, Finus M (2007). Measures to Enhance the Success of Global Climate Treaties. International Environmental Agreements, 7, 73-97.
Finus M, Rundshagen B (2006). A micro foundation of core stability in positive-externality coalition games. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 162(2), 329-346. Abstract.
Eyckmans J, Finus M (2006). Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making. Natural Resource Modeling, 19, 323-358.
Eyckmans J, Finus M (2006). New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: the Case of Global Warming. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 7, 391-414.
Carraro C, Eyckmans J, Finus M (2006). Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements. Review of Internationl Organizations, 1, 379-396.
Altamirano-Cabrera JC, Finus M (2006). Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements. Journal of Applied Economics, 9(1), 19-47. Abstract.
van Ierland EC, Dellink R, Finus M (2006). Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game. Economics of Governance, 7, 271-291.
Weikard HP, Finus M, Altamirano-Cabrera JC (2006). The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements. Oxford Economic Papers, 58(2), 209-232. Abstract.
Finus M, Altamirano-Cabrera JC, EC VI (2005). The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements. Public Choice, 125(1-2), 95-127. Abstract.
Finus M, Tjotta S (2003). The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?. Journal of Public Economics, 87(9-10), 2031-2048. Abstract.
Endres A, Finus M (2002). Quotas may beat taxes in a global emission game. International Tax and Public Finance, 9(6), 687-707. Abstract.
Endres A, Finus M (1999). International environmental agreements: How the policy instrument affects equilibrium emissions and welfare. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 155(3), 527-550. Abstract.
Finus M, Rundshagen B (1998). Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a global emission game when players are impatient. Environmental & Resource Economics, 12(3), 275-306. Abstract.
Finus M, Rundshagen B (1998). Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control. PUBLIC CHOICE, 96(1-2), 145-186. Abstract.

Chapters

Finus M, Eyckmans J (2009). Transfer Schemes and Institutional Changes for Sustainable Global Climate Treaties. In Guesnerie R, Tulkens H (Eds.) The Design of Climate Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 103-135.
Finus M (2007). Possibilities for Cooperation in International Pollution Control. In Cogoy M, Steininger KW (Eds.) The Economics of Global Environmental Change – International Cooperation for Sustainability, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 157-195.
Finus M, Böhringer C (2005). The Kyoto Protocol: Success or Failure?. In Helm D (Ed) Climate-change Policy, Oxford, UK: Oxford Economic Press, 253-281.
Finus M (2004). International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems. In  (Ed) Welfare Economics of Sustainable Development from Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO, Oxford, UK: Eolss Publishers.
Finus M, Rundshagen B (2003). Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control: a Partition Function Approach. In Carraro C (Ed) The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 199-243.
Finus M (2003). New Developments in Coalition Theory: an Application to the Case of Global Pollution. In Marsiliani L, Rauscher M, Withagen C (Eds.) Environmental Policy in an International Perspective, Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 19-49.
Finus M (2003). Stability and Design of International Environmental Agreements: the Case of Transboundary Pollution. In Folmer H, Tietenberg T (Eds.) International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics - 2003/4, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 82-158.
Finus M (2002). Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation: Any Practical Application?. In Böhringer C, Finus M, Vogt C (Eds.) Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 9-104.
Finus M, Endres A, Rundshagen B (2001). EOLSS-Level Writing in Financial Resource Policy and Management: Strategic Aspects of Implementing the International Agreement on Climate Change. In Tolba MK (Ed) Our Fragile World: Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Development, Oxford: Eolss Publishers, 2075-2088.
Finus M, Endres A (1998). Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in a Bargaining Game over Global Emission Reductions – Does the Instrumental Framework Matter?. In Hanley N, Folmer H (Eds.) Game Theory and the Global Environment, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 135-164.

Publications by year


In Press

Finus M, Pintassilgo P, Ulph A (In Press). International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty.
Finus M, Rundshagen B, Eyckmans J (In Press). Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?. Annals of Operations Research
Finus M, Dellink R (In Press). Uncertainty and Climate Treaties: Does Ignorance Pay?.

2010

Pintassilgo P, Finus M, Lindroos M, Munro G (2010). Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. Environmental and Resource Economics, 46, 377-402.

2009

Finus M, Saiz ME, EMT H (2009). An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements. Environment and Development Economics, 14, 117-137. Abstract.
Finus M, Rundshagen B (2009). Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games. Social Choice and Welfare, 32(3), 389-406. Abstract.
Finus M, Eyckmans J, Rundshagen B (2009). Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?.
Finus M, Pintassilgo P, Schneider R (2009). Spatial Allocation of Property Rights – the Case of International Fishery.
Finus M, Pintassilgo P (2009). The Role of Uncertainty and Learning for the Success of International Climate Agreements.
Finus M, Eyckmans J (2009). Transfer Schemes and Institutional Changes for Sustainable Global Climate Treaties. In Guesnerie R, Tulkens H (Eds.) The Design of Climate Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 103-135.

2008

Finus M, Rübbelke DTG (2008). Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy.
Altamirano-Cabrera JC, Finus M, Dellink R (2008). Do abatement quotas lead to more successful climate coalitions?. Manchester School, 76(1), 104-129. Abstract.
Finus M (2008). Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks and Future Challenges. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 29-67.
Finus M, Maus S (2008). Modesty may pay!. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10(5), 801-826. Abstract.
Finus M (2008). The Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or Promising Concepts?. Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 1, 13-25.
Dellink R, Finus M, Olieman N (2008). The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement. Environmental & Resource Economics, 39(4), 357-377. Abstract.

2007

Eyckmans J, Finus M (2007). Measures to Enhance the Success of Global Climate Treaties. International Environmental Agreements, 7, 73-97.
Finus M (2007). Possibilities for Cooperation in International Pollution Control. In Cogoy M, Steininger KW (Eds.) The Economics of Global Environmental Change – International Cooperation for Sustainability, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 157-195.

2006

Finus M, Rundshagen B (2006). A micro foundation of core stability in positive-externality coalition games. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 162(2), 329-346. Abstract.
Eyckmans J, Finus M (2006). Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making. Natural Resource Modeling, 19, 323-358.
Eyckmans J, Finus M (2006). New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: the Case of Global Warming. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 7, 391-414.
Carraro C, Eyckmans J, Finus M (2006). Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements. Review of Internationl Organizations, 1, 379-396.
Altamirano-Cabrera JC, Finus M (2006). Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements. Journal of Applied Economics, 9(1), 19-47. Abstract.
van Ierland EC, Dellink R, Finus M (2006). Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game. Economics of Governance, 7, 271-291.
Weikard HP, Finus M, Altamirano-Cabrera JC (2006). The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements. Oxford Economic Papers, 58(2), 209-232. Abstract.

2005

Finus M, Böhringer C (2005). The Kyoto Protocol: Success or Failure?. In Helm D (Ed) Climate-change Policy, Oxford, UK: Oxford Economic Press, 253-281.
Finus M, Altamirano-Cabrera JC, EC VI (2005). The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements. Public Choice, 125(1-2), 95-127. Abstract.

2004

Finus M (2004). International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems. In  (Ed) Welfare Economics of Sustainable Development from Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO, Oxford, UK: Eolss Publishers.

2003

Finus M, Rundshagen B (2003). Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control: a Partition Function Approach. In Carraro C (Ed) The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 199-243.
Finus M (2003). New Developments in Coalition Theory: an Application to the Case of Global Pollution. In Marsiliani L, Rauscher M, Withagen C (Eds.) Environmental Policy in an International Perspective, Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 19-49.
Finus M (2003). Stability and Design of International Environmental Agreements: the Case of Transboundary Pollution. In Folmer H, Tietenberg T (Eds.) International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics - 2003/4, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 82-158.
Finus M, Tjotta S (2003). The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?. Journal of Public Economics, 87(9-10), 2031-2048. Abstract.

2002

Böhringer C, Finus M, Vogt C (eds)(2002). Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice.  Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar.
Finus M (2002). Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation: Any Practical Application?. In Böhringer C, Finus M, Vogt C (Eds.) Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 9-104.
Endres A, Finus M (2002). Quotas may beat taxes in a global emission game. International Tax and Public Finance, 9(6), 687-707. Abstract.

2001

Finus M, Endres A, Rundshagen B (2001). EOLSS-Level Writing in Financial Resource Policy and Management: Strategic Aspects of Implementing the International Agreement on Climate Change. In Tolba MK (Ed) Our Fragile World: Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Development, Oxford: Eolss Publishers, 2075-2088.
Finus M (2001). Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation.  Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar.

1999

Endres A, Finus M (1999). International environmental agreements: How the policy instrument affects equilibrium emissions and welfare. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 155(3), 527-550. Abstract.

1998

Finus M, Endres A (1998). Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in a Bargaining Game over Global Emission Reductions – Does the Instrumental Framework Matter?. In Hanley N, Folmer H (Eds.) Game Theory and the Global Environment, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 135-164.
Finus M, Rundshagen B (1998). Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a global emission game when players are impatient. Environmental & Resource Economics, 12(3), 275-306. Abstract.
Finus M, Rundshagen B (1998). Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control. PUBLIC CHOICE, 96(1-2), 145-186. Abstract.

Conferences and invited presentations

Since 2000

  • 'The International Dimension of Environmental Economics', Lectures, European Summer School on Resource and Environmental Economics organised by the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM),Venice, Italy, July 2000.
  • 'Coalition Theory Network Workshop', Keynote Paper, CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, 26-27 January 2001.
  • 'International Environmental Agreements', Lectures, DFG Workshop, ZEW, Mannheim, Germany, 18-19 May 2001.
  • 'The International Dimension of Environmental Policy Workshop', Keynote Paper, Acquafredda di Maratea, European Science Foundation, Italy, 6-11 October 2001.
  • 'Game Theory and the Environment', Lectures, International Summer School organised by the Institute of Mathematics and Game Theory, University of Genoa and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Lavagna, Italy, 2-14 September 2002.
  • 'Game Theory and Coalition Formation in International Pollution Control', Lectures, University of Heidelberg, Germany, PhD program 'Environmental and Resource Economics', 13-14 November 2002.
  • 'CLIMNEG-Workshop International Environmental Agreements', Invited paper, Leuven, Belgium, 14 March 2003.
  • 'Fourth EEP Plenary Workshop and EEP Conference' on 'The Future of Climate Policy', Invited Paper, Cagliari, Italy, 27-28 March 2003.
  • DIW Workshop 'International Institutions for Sustainability', Invited Paper, Berlin, Germany, 12-13 June 2003.
  • DFG Workshop, Invited Paper, ZEW, Mannheim, Germany, 14 June 2003.
  • 'Game Theoretical Analyses of International Environmental Agreements', Lecture, PhD program, Venice International University, Italy, 3-17 May 2004.
  • Workshop 'Global Public Goods Management: Lessons from Game Theory and Practice for Post-Kyoto Negotiations', Keynote Paper, organised by University Computense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 17-18 November 2005.
  • '6th Meeting on Game Theory and Practice', Keynote Paper, Zaragoza, Spain, 10-12 July 2006.
  • PhD Programme, Lecture, Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki, Finland, 2 October 2007.
  • Workshop 'Discounting and Uncertainty in International Agreements and How to Deal with Policy Recommendations?', Keynote Paper, Workshop organised by the NCCR Climate, Swiss Climate Research and the University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland, 8-10 November 2007.
  • '13th Coalition Theory Network Workshop', Keynote Paper, Venice, Italy, 24-25 January 2008.
  • Public Debate 'Challenges of Climate Change', Invited Presentation, organised by the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, 10 April 2008.
  • International Workshop 'Coalitions for Climate Cooperation. A Game- Theoretic Analysis of Post 2012 Climate Policy', Invited Paper, Venice, Italy, 15-16 June 2009.

External positions

  • President-elect of the German Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
  • Member of Editorial Board, Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences
  • Visiting Fellow at the Smith Centre, University of Oxford
  • Lead Author working for the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

  • Microeconomics
  • Public economics
  • Environmental and resource economics

Professor Finus has a broad interest in analysing how people act in different institutional, political and legal frameworks. Microeconomics provides the basic tool to understand and analyse various incentive schemes that affect people's behaviour. However, not all goods are traded in markets; important exceptions are public goods, like for instance public security, public transport and infrastructure and environmental quality (such as clean air).

The central question is whether governments should play a role in providing these goods (or whether this should be left to private entities) and if so how much should be supplied. Global public goods, such as for instance the eradication of internationally transmitted diseases, the protection of citizens against international terrorism and reducing the threat of climate change, pose a particular challenge to the global community as they can only be provided effectively jointly - contributions by a single or a few countries will either have only a marginal or no effect at all.

Taught modules