Dr Lindsay joined the Business School in September 2013 after having spent three years as a postdoc at the University of Zurich. He earned his first degree from Balliol College, Oxford and his PhD from the University of Nottingham.
His recent research has involved using laboratory experiments to investigate decision making, behaviour in markets, and how different market institutions perform. He has obtained research support from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Swiss National Science Foundation.
Nationality: British
Qualifications
Links
Research clusters
Research interests
- Decision Theory
- Experimental Economics
- Market Design
Dr Lindsay’s research focuses on how people make decisions, how people behave in markets, and how different market institutions operate. The research fits broadly in the fields of behavioural economics and market design. He has made extensive use of laboratory experiments. The research is rooted in economics but draws on psychology, computer science, and operations research. He has investigated the following questions. What are the implications of small stakes risk aversion? Why does loss aversion appear to vary with market experience? How can items be reassigned without exposing traders to losses? How does the design of markets affect price dynamics? Can the programme for an academic conference be improved by taking into account the preferences of participants? A common theme of the projects is a focus on dynamics as well as final outcomes and equilibrium. As well as deepening our understanding of economic phenomena, the research programme involves improving the design of market institutions, which has large potential benefits for society.
Key publications | Publications by category | Publications by year
Key publications
Goeree JK, Lindsay L (2019). The Exposure Problem and Market Design.
The Review of Economic Studies DOI.
Goeree JK, Lindsay L (2016). Market design and the stability of general equilibrium.
Journal of Economic Theory,
165, 37-68.
Abstract:
Market design and the stability of general equilibrium
We employ laboratory methods to study the stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf's economy (Scarf, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without converging. Anderson et al. (2004) report that in laboratory double auction markets, prices in the Scarf economy do indeed oscillate with no clear sign of convergence. We replicate their experiments and confirm that tatonnement theory predicts the direction of price changes remarkably well. Prices are globally unstable with adverse effects for the economy's efficiency and the equitable distribution of the gains from trade.We also introduce a novel market mechanism where participants submit demand schedules and prices are computed using Smale's global Newtonian dynamic (Smale, 1976b). If the submitted schedules are competitive - sets of quantities that maximize utility taking prices as given - the resulting outcome is the unique competitive equilibrium of Scarf's economy. In experiments using the schedule market, prices converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium. Besides stabilizing prices, the schedule market is more efficient and results in highly egalitarian outcomes.
Abstract.
DOI.
Publications by category
Journal articles
Lindsay L (2019). Adaptive loss aversion and market experience.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
168, 43-61.
DOI.
Goeree JK, Lindsay L (2019). The Exposure Problem and Market Design.
The Review of Economic Studies DOI.
Humphrey SJ, Lindsay L, Starmer C (2017). Consumption experience, choice experience and the endowment effect.
Journal of the Economic Science Association,
3, 109-120.
DOI.
Lindsay L (2017). Shapley Value Based Pricing for Auctions and Exchanges.
Games and Economic Behavior,
108, 170-181.
DOI.
Goeree JK, Lindsay L (2016). Market design and the stability of general equilibrium.
Journal of Economic Theory,
165, 37-68.
Abstract:
Market design and the stability of general equilibrium
We employ laboratory methods to study the stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf's economy (Scarf, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without converging. Anderson et al. (2004) report that in laboratory double auction markets, prices in the Scarf economy do indeed oscillate with no clear sign of convergence. We replicate their experiments and confirm that tatonnement theory predicts the direction of price changes remarkably well. Prices are globally unstable with adverse effects for the economy's efficiency and the equitable distribution of the gains from trade.We also introduce a novel market mechanism where participants submit demand schedules and prices are computed using Smale's global Newtonian dynamic (Smale, 1976b). If the submitted schedules are competitive - sets of quantities that maximize utility taking prices as given - the resulting outcome is the unique competitive equilibrium of Scarf's economy. In experiments using the schedule market, prices converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium. Besides stabilizing prices, the schedule market is more efficient and results in highly egalitarian outcomes.
Abstract.
DOI.
Lindsay L (2013). The arguments of utility: Preference reversals
in expected utility of income models.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
46(2), 175-189.
Abstract:
The arguments of utility: Preference reversals
in expected utility of income models
There is a debate in the literature about the arguments of utility in expected
utility theory. Some implicitly assume utility is defined on final wealth whereas others argue it may be defined on initial wealth and income separately. I argue that
making income and wealth separate arguments of utility has important implications
that may not be widely recognized. A framework is presented that allows the unified treatment of expected utility models and anomalies. I show that expected utility
of income models can predict framing induced preference reversals, a willingness
to pay-willingness to accept gap for lotteries, and choice-value preference reversals. The main contribution is a theorem. It is proved that for all utility functions
where initial wealth and income enter separately, either there will be preference
reversals or preferences can be represented by a utility function defined on final
wealth alone.
Abstract.
DOI.
Lindsay L (2011). Correlated Individual Differences and Choice Prediction.
Games,
2(1), 16-20.
Abstract:
Correlated Individual Differences and Choice Prediction
This note briefly summarizes the consequences of adding correlated individual differences to the best baseline model in the Games competition, I-SAW. I find evidence that the traits of an individual are correlated, but refining I-SAW to capture these correlations does not significantly improve the model’s accuracy when predicting average behavior.
Abstract.
DOI.
Publications by year
2019
Lindsay L (2019). Adaptive loss aversion and market experience.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
168, 43-61.
DOI.
Goeree JK, Lindsay L (2019). The Exposure Problem and Market Design.
The Review of Economic Studies DOI.
2017
Humphrey SJ, Lindsay L, Starmer C (2017). Consumption experience, choice experience and the endowment effect.
Journal of the Economic Science Association,
3, 109-120.
DOI.
Lindsay L (2017). Shapley Value Based Pricing for Auctions and Exchanges.
Games and Economic Behavior,
108, 170-181.
DOI.
2016
Goeree JK, Lindsay L (2016). Market design and the stability of general equilibrium.
Journal of Economic Theory,
165, 37-68.
Abstract:
Market design and the stability of general equilibrium
We employ laboratory methods to study the stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf's economy (Scarf, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without converging. Anderson et al. (2004) report that in laboratory double auction markets, prices in the Scarf economy do indeed oscillate with no clear sign of convergence. We replicate their experiments and confirm that tatonnement theory predicts the direction of price changes remarkably well. Prices are globally unstable with adverse effects for the economy's efficiency and the equitable distribution of the gains from trade.We also introduce a novel market mechanism where participants submit demand schedules and prices are computed using Smale's global Newtonian dynamic (Smale, 1976b). If the submitted schedules are competitive - sets of quantities that maximize utility taking prices as given - the resulting outcome is the unique competitive equilibrium of Scarf's economy. In experiments using the schedule market, prices converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium. Besides stabilizing prices, the schedule market is more efficient and results in highly egalitarian outcomes.
Abstract.
DOI.
2013
Lindsay L (2013). The arguments of utility: Preference reversals
in expected utility of income models.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
46(2), 175-189.
Abstract:
The arguments of utility: Preference reversals
in expected utility of income models
There is a debate in the literature about the arguments of utility in expected
utility theory. Some implicitly assume utility is defined on final wealth whereas others argue it may be defined on initial wealth and income separately. I argue that
making income and wealth separate arguments of utility has important implications
that may not be widely recognized. A framework is presented that allows the unified treatment of expected utility models and anomalies. I show that expected utility
of income models can predict framing induced preference reversals, a willingness
to pay-willingness to accept gap for lotteries, and choice-value preference reversals. The main contribution is a theorem. It is proved that for all utility functions
where initial wealth and income enter separately, either there will be preference
reversals or preferences can be represented by a utility function defined on final
wealth alone.
Abstract.
DOI.
2012
Goeree JK, Lindsay L (2012). Designing Package Markets to Eliminate Exposure Risk.
DOI.
Goeree JK, Lindsay L (2012). Stabilizing the Economy: Market Design and General Equilibrium.
DOI.
2011
Lindsay L (2011). Correlated Individual Differences and Choice Prediction.
Games,
2(1), 16-20.
Abstract:
Correlated Individual Differences and Choice Prediction
This note briefly summarizes the consequences of adding correlated individual differences to the best baseline model in the Games competition, I-SAW. I find evidence that the traits of an individual are correlated, but refining I-SAW to capture these correlations does not significantly improve the model’s accuracy when predicting average behavior.
Abstract.
DOI.
Dr Lindsay has taught a range of courses. He has a particular interest in using experiments to teach economics.
Modules
2022/23
