Key publications
Maloney J, Pickering A (2015). Voting and the economic cycle.
Public Choice,
162(1), 119-133.
Abstract:
Voting and the economic cycle
Sophisticated voters assess incumbent competence by filtering out economic cycles (which they do not like) from trend growth (which they do). Naive voters on the other hand respond only to raw economic growth. This implies that voting in the aggregate should respond asymmetrically to the economic cycle. Upswings are rewarded by the naive, but punished by the sophisticated. Downswings are punished by all voters. Using an established dataset of over 400 general elections we find that the incumbent vote share (a) responds differently to trend growth than to the cycle, (b) does not respond significantly to positive variation in the economic cycle, and (c) responds significantly and negatively to negative realizations in the economic cycle. In contrast to standard formulations of the ‘grievance asymmetry’ this asymmetric vote response is found to be independent of trend growth.
Abstract.
DOI.
Hodgson R, Maloney J (2013). Bandwagon effects in British elections, 1885-1910.
Public Choice,
157(1-2), 73-90.
Abstract:
Bandwagon effects in British elections, 1885-1910
This article investigates possible bandwagons in actual elections rather than the usual opinion poll data. Until 1918, British general elections were staggered over a fortnight or more. We use the eight general elections between 1885 and 1910 to investigate whether there was a general bandwagon or underdog effect as the election progressed. We find that any bandwagon effect was in favor of the party which eventually won the election, not the party gaining seats compared with last time. We also find that a typical election featured an initial bandwagon effect which peaked about halfway through the election and then declined. Its decline appears to be due both to declining enthusiasm for the leading party and to later polls occurring in places where voters were less prone to get on a bandwagon in the first place. The weakening of the bandwagon was correlated to distance of the constituency from London, although it revived to some extent in Scotland. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Abstract.
DOI.
Maloney J, Pickering AC (2013). Party activists, campaign funding, and the quality of government.
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
29(1), 210-238.
Abstract:
Party activists, campaign funding, and the quality of government
We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout depends on party activists and campaign spending-parties' "political capital." the functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium rentseeking in government. If activists and donors are better than the ordinary voter at distinguishing between good governments and lucky governments, then the more potent political capital is the less the extent of rent-seeking. This situation also rules out finite limits on election spending, though a zero limit could be the optimum if donors and activists are close enough substitutes in the work they do for the party. The one policy that is never optimal is a finite limit on local spending. © 2012 the Author.
Abstract.
DOI.
Hodgson R, Maloney J (2012). Economic voting in Britain, 1857–1914.
Electoral Studies,
31(4), 668-678.
DOI.
Maloney J (2012). The treasury and the New Cambridge School in the 1970s.
Cambridge Journal of Economics,
36(4), 997-1017.
Abstract:
The treasury and the New Cambridge School in the 1970s
With the release of Treasury papers from the 1970s under the 30-year rule we have a much more complete picture of the dispute in the 1970s between the Treasury and the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG), especially given the role of three Cambridge economists-Nicholas Kaldor, Wynne Godley and Francis Cripps-as ministerial advisers at the time. The records show some eventual closing of the gap between the Treasury and the CEPG regarding the latter's proposition of stable private-sector NAFA (where NAFA stands for net acquisition of private sector assets) and its implications for demand management and the balance of payments. In contrast, the initial differences on counterinflation policy and, above all, on import controls versus free trade were wider at the end of the decade than at the start of it. © the Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.
Abstract.
DOI.
Publications by year
2018
Maloney J, Pickering A (2018). The Economic Consequences of Political Donation Limits.
Economica,
85(339), 479-517.
Abstract:
The Economic Consequences of Political Donation Limits
The economic consequences of limits on political donations depend on the degree of political competition. Donors, who are ideologically aligned with candidates, decide how much to contribute to their own candidate. They may benefit from rent-seeking by their own candidate but dislike rent-seeking by the opposition. Increased rent-seeking by politicians thus generates campaign contributions for themselves but also mobilizes donations to the opposing candidate, potentially to a greater extent. This latter effect acts as a deterrent to rent-seeking when contributions finance electoral campaigns and positively affect election chances. When political competition is low, incumbent donors outnumber opposition donors, and limits reduce rent-seeking. When political competition is high, donors are equalized and laissez-faire reduces rent-seeking. Consistent with these hypotheses, data from the USA suggest that limits are associated with better policies and stronger growth performance at low levels of political competition, while laissez-faire is preferred when political competition is high.
Abstract.
DOI.
2017
Maloney J, Barkovic-Parsons, C. Hodgson R (2017). Are marginals different? Evidence from British elections, 1950-2015.
Public Choice,
171 DOI.
2015
Maloney J, Pickering A (2015). Voting and the economic cycle.
Public Choice,
162(1), 119-133.
Abstract:
Voting and the economic cycle
Sophisticated voters assess incumbent competence by filtering out economic cycles (which they do not like) from trend growth (which they do). Naive voters on the other hand respond only to raw economic growth. This implies that voting in the aggregate should respond asymmetrically to the economic cycle. Upswings are rewarded by the naive, but punished by the sophisticated. Downswings are punished by all voters. Using an established dataset of over 400 general elections we find that the incumbent vote share (a) responds differently to trend growth than to the cycle, (b) does not respond significantly to positive variation in the economic cycle, and (c) responds significantly and negatively to negative realizations in the economic cycle. In contrast to standard formulations of the ‘grievance asymmetry’ this asymmetric vote response is found to be independent of trend growth.
Abstract.
DOI.
2014
Maloney J (2014). The Historiography of Economics: the Collected Papers of A.W. Coats: Volume III.
The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought,
21(3), 526-529.
DOI.
2013
Hodgson R, Maloney J (2013). Bandwagon effects in British elections, 1885-1910.
Public Choice,
157(1-2), 73-90.
Abstract:
Bandwagon effects in British elections, 1885-1910
This article investigates possible bandwagons in actual elections rather than the usual opinion poll data. Until 1918, British general elections were staggered over a fortnight or more. We use the eight general elections between 1885 and 1910 to investigate whether there was a general bandwagon or underdog effect as the election progressed. We find that any bandwagon effect was in favor of the party which eventually won the election, not the party gaining seats compared with last time. We also find that a typical election featured an initial bandwagon effect which peaked about halfway through the election and then declined. Its decline appears to be due both to declining enthusiasm for the leading party and to later polls occurring in places where voters were less prone to get on a bandwagon in the first place. The weakening of the bandwagon was correlated to distance of the constituency from London, although it revived to some extent in Scotland. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Abstract.
DOI.
Maloney J (2013). Memorial address. In (Ed)
Mark Blaug: Rebel with Many Causes, 11-13.
DOI.
Maloney J, Pickering AC (2013). Party activists, campaign funding, and the quality of government.
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
29(1), 210-238.
Abstract:
Party activists, campaign funding, and the quality of government
We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout depends on party activists and campaign spending-parties' "political capital." the functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium rentseeking in government. If activists and donors are better than the ordinary voter at distinguishing between good governments and lucky governments, then the more potent political capital is the less the extent of rent-seeking. This situation also rules out finite limits on election spending, though a zero limit could be the optimum if donors and activists are close enough substitutes in the work they do for the party. The one policy that is never optimal is a finite limit on local spending. © 2012 the Author.
Abstract.
DOI.
2012
Hodgson R, Maloney J (2012). Economic voting in Britain, 1857–1914.
Electoral Studies,
31(4), 668-678.
DOI.
Maloney J (2012). The Intellectual Foundations of Alfred Marshall’s Economic Science: a Rounded Globe of Knowledge.
History of Political Economy,
44(1), 189-191.
DOI.
Maloney J (2012). The treasury and the New Cambridge School in the 1970s.
Cambridge Journal of Economics,
36(4), 997-1017.
Abstract:
The treasury and the New Cambridge School in the 1970s
With the release of Treasury papers from the 1970s under the 30-year rule we have a much more complete picture of the dispute in the 1970s between the Treasury and the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG), especially given the role of three Cambridge economists-Nicholas Kaldor, Wynne Godley and Francis Cripps-as ministerial advisers at the time. The records show some eventual closing of the gap between the Treasury and the CEPG regarding the latter's proposition of stable private-sector NAFA (where NAFA stands for net acquisition of private sector assets) and its implications for demand management and the balance of payments. In contrast, the initial differences on counterinflation policy and, above all, on import controls versus free trade were wider at the end of the decade than at the start of it. © the Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.
Abstract.
DOI.
2011
Maloney J (2011). No wealth but life: welfare economics and the welfare state in Britain, 1880-1945.
Economic History Review,
64(4), 1399-1401.
DOI.
Maloney J (2011). Straightening the phillips curve, 1968-1976.
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought,
18(3), 407-440.
Abstract:
Straightening the phillips curve, 1968-1976
This paper looks at the change in the British Treasury's macroeconomic thinking between Friedman's statement of the natural rate doctrine in 1968 and Prime Minister Callaghan's public abandonment of Keynesian demand management in 1976. Simultaneously rising unemployment and inflation made the Treasury sceptical about the old Phillips curve from the start, but, far from moving smoothly to the expectations-augmented version, it hesitated between assuming the curve had shifted outwards, abandoning any idea of a Phillips curve, and adhering to a 'New Cambridge' curve where unemployment made inflation worse. Eventually a tense Treasury meeting abandoned money illusion by majority vote. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.
Abstract.
DOI.
2010
Maloney J, Boylan T (2010). Charles Francis Bastable on Trade and Public Finance. In Boylan T, Prendergast R, Turner J (Eds.)
Ireland and Politcal Economy: Towards a History of Irish Economic Thought, London: Routledge.
Abstract:
Charles Francis Bastable on Trade and Public Finance
Abstract.
2008
Maloney J (2008). AW Bob coats, 1924-2007.
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought,
15(1), 129-133.
DOI.
Maloney J (2008). From the Corn Laws to free trade: Interests, ideas, and institutions in historical perspective. History of Political Economy, 40(2), 413-414.
2006
Maloney J (2006). Britain's single currency debate of the late 1860s.
European Journal of the History of Economic Though,
13(4), 513-531.
Abstract:
Britain's single currency debate of the late 1860s
Though a Royal Commission had rejected Britain joining the Latin Monetary Union, Robert Lowe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said he would recommend membership provided three conditions were satisfied. As these included a general adherence to the gold standard, nothing further came of it. But meanwhile there had been a complex public discussion of the subject, and the related topic of shrinking the pound coin so it weighed the same as the 25-franc piece. The debate shed much light on the contemporary state of value and monetary theory, and those who supported the changes had the best of it.
Abstract.
DOI.
Maloney J (2006). Gladstones Gladstone? the Chancellorship of Robert Lowe 1868-73.
Historical Research,
79(205), 404-428.
DOI.
2005
Maloney J (2005). Robert Lowe, the Times and Political Economy.
Journal of the History of Economic Thought,
27(1), 41-58.
DOI.
Maloney J (2005). The political economy of Robert Lowe., Palgrave MacMillan.
2003
Maloney J, Pearson BR, Pickering AC (2003). Behind the cube rule: implications of, and evidence against a fractal electoral geography.
Environment and Planning A,
35(8), 1405-1414.
DOI.
Maloney J, Hadri K, Pickering AC (2003). Political Business Cycles and Central Bank Independence.
The Economic Journal,
113(486), C167-C181.
DOI.
2000
Arabsheibani G, de Meza D, Maloney J, Pearson B (2000). And a vision appeared unto them of a great profit: evidence of self-deception among the self-employed.
Economics Letters,
67(1), 35-41.
Abstract:
And a vision appeared unto them of a great profit: evidence of self-deception among the self-employed
Evidence is presented that the self-employed expect better financial outcomes than do employees but experience worse realisations. This is consistent with theories that entrepreneurship is driven by unrealistic optimism. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
Abstract.
1999
Maloney J, Macmillen M (1999). Do currency unions grow too large for their own good?.
Economic Journal,
109(458), 572-587.
Abstract:
Do currency unions grow too large for their own good?
This article puts a rigorous foundation under the proposition that currency areas, as they admit more members, face a rising marginal cost curve which cuts the marginal benefit curve from below. However, at any given time, the median member faces lower marginal cost than the average member, so that, if new members are admitted by majority vote, and existing members are myopic, the currency area will expand beyond its optimum size. Although the currency area imposes negative externalities on countries outside it, we find that the existence of one currency union has no effect on the costs or benefits of forming or enlarging another.
Abstract.
1998
Hadri K, Lockwood B, Maloney J (1998). Does central bank independence smooth the political business cycle in inflation? Some OECD evidence.
Manchester School,
66(4), 377-395.
Abstract:
Does central bank independence smooth the political business cycle in inflation? Some OECD evidence
In this paper, electoral and partisan effects in inflation are identified for 18 OECD countries via regression analysis, building on the work of Alesina, Cohen and Roubini. The correlation of the size of these effects across countries with the level of central bank independence is investigated; the results suggest a negative correlation.
Abstract.
