Lora Dimitrova is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Exeter Business School. Her research focuses on entrepreneurial finance, corporate innovation, and venture capital. Her work has been published in top academic journals such as the Journal of Accounting and Economics, and the Journal of Banking and Finance. Her work has won several research grants including the Coller Institute of Venture Research Grant, the British Academy Leverhulme Research Grant and Chaire Fintech AMF Grant. Her research has also been awarded the Coller Institute of Private Equity Runner-up Prize. Lora earned her Ph.D. in Finance from the London Business School, and her M.Sc. in Finance from Concordia University.
Nationality: Bulgarian/Canadian
Qualifications
- PhD (London Business School)
- MSc (Concordia University)
Links
Research clusters
Research interests
- Corporate Finance
- Entrepreneurial Finance
- Venture Capital
- Innovation
- Private Equity
Key publications | Publications by category | Publications by year
Publications by category
Journal articles
Dimitrova L (2017). Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the "poor man's private equity funds".
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS,
63(1), 99-120.
Author URL.
DOI.
Dimitrova L (2017). Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the “poor man's private equity funds”.
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
63(1), 99-120.
Abstract:
Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the “poor man's private equity funds”
Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are an alternative investment, structured as a one-shot private equity (PE) deal. Significant cross-sectional variation exists in SPACs' performance, which can be explained by the strong implicit incentives embedded in contracts. SPAC performance is worse for acquisitions announced near the predetermined two-year deadline, for acquisitions with deferred initial public offering underwriting fees, and for acquisitions with market value close to the required 80% threshold. Also, sponsors' involvement in the merged firm's governance improves long-term performance. This evidence has important implications given SPACs' high popularity in recent years and the new PE industry's trend toward deal-by-deal fund-raising.
Abstract.
Full text.
DOI.
Basu N, Dimitrova L, Paeglis I (2009). Family control and dilution in mergers.
Journal of Banking and Finance,
33(5), 829-841.
DOI.
Publications by year
2017
Dimitrova L (2017). Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the "poor man's private equity funds".
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS,
63(1), 99-120.
Author URL.
DOI.
Dimitrova L (2017). Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the “poor man's private equity funds”.
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
63(1), 99-120.
Abstract:
Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the “poor man's private equity funds”
Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are an alternative investment, structured as a one-shot private equity (PE) deal. Significant cross-sectional variation exists in SPACs' performance, which can be explained by the strong implicit incentives embedded in contracts. SPAC performance is worse for acquisitions announced near the predetermined two-year deadline, for acquisitions with deferred initial public offering underwriting fees, and for acquisitions with market value close to the required 80% threshold. Also, sponsors' involvement in the merged firm's governance improves long-term performance. This evidence has important implications given SPACs' high popularity in recent years and the new PE industry's trend toward deal-by-deal fund-raising.
Abstract.
Full text.
DOI.
2009
Basu N, Dimitrova L, Paeglis I (2009). Family control and dilution in mergers.
Journal of Banking and Finance,
33(5), 829-841.
DOI.
