Decentralised Bilateral Trading in a Market with Incomplete Information
Paper number: 13/13
Paper date: August 18, 2013
Paper Category: Discussion Paper
Kalyan Chatterjee and Kaustav Das
We study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value. There are two identical buyers and another seller, whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the informed seller. We consider two infinite horizon games, with public and private simultaneous one-sided offers respectively and simultaneous responses. We show that there is a stationary perfect Bayes' equilibrium for both models such that prices in all transactions converge to the same value as the discount factor goes to 1.
JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D82
Keywords: Bilateral Bargaining, Incomplete information, Outside options, Coase conjecture.